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Introduction

There has been a noted interest in the new technologies of the nineties, those that
have expanded the realm of traditional mass media and the traditional means o f
communication that people were previously used to. W ith the start o f globalization and
the world becoming what some have called “ global village,” the act of distributing
information to the four comers o f the w orld has become less complicated than it used to
be, and boundaries are seen as constantly being eroded by the new pressures o f
modernization and liberalization.

The internet and satellite televisions increased in

importance in this realm, and so did the study o f the impact of these means o f
communication on civil society and governments. The purpose of this study is to observe
and analyze the impact of the new media, this new public sphere, on civil society and its
politics, particularly in the case o f Lebanon.

M y objective is to understand how the

dynamics o f the New Media and those o f local politics interact and affect each other, and
consequently to what extent this interaction is encouraging or permitting democratization
and freedom of speech.

In other words, is the New Media affecting the Lebanese

political discourse? Or is it reinforcing the power o f traditional politicians?

Case Study
In order to achieve this, I build on Habermas’ work on the public sphere o f
democratic debate, political dialogue, and o f newspapers, journals, pamphlets, and books,
extending it to the audiovisual realm.

Moreover, I examine the main criticism s o f

Habermas’ work and observe alternatives and an expansion o f his theory. As a result, I
argue that in contemporary societies, an increase and redefinition of the public sphere is
taking place because of new technologies and that these developments play an im portant
part in our societies, and can possibly shape their development. M y case study focuses
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on Lebanon, questioning who are the real voices behind the new mass media, and in
p a rticu la r satellite television? W hat is their message or function? W hat are they trying to
achieve?

A n d how are they putting forward their agenda or free speech? O r are they

able to prom ote an agenda in the first place? I analyze the p o litic a l struggle that these
in stitu tio n s face, and their financial difficulties and subsequent lim itations. Moreover, I
ask how the grow th o f Satellite w ill influence Lebanon and the Arab w o rld as a result.
H o w the p o p u la rity and accessibility o f satellite television is changing the way the Arabs
see themselves and the rest o f the world? W ill increased freedom o f inform ation be an
ind ica tion o f a new democracy, or is satellite television ju s t a subtle form o f indirect
control and a governmental distraction? And how do state interests influence the satellite
channels, or are they actually free o f any political pressures? F in ally, I ask whether the
“ N ew M e d ia ” should be looked at as one body o f com m unication, or whether satellite
technology should be looked at separately from other means o f com m unication such as
the Internet, because o f the structural differences that these tw o contain.

M ethodology
T o do this, I look at satellite television stations in Lebanon and their relationship
w ith the Lebanese government.

I provide a historical background to base the current

situation o f these media in Lebanon, as w ell as its position w ith in the Arab W o rld and the
regional race towards satellite technology.

I look at the d iffe ren t attempts to censor these

stations, as w e ll as their financial and contextual lim itatio ns.

I create a longitudinal

analysis o f the elements o f censorship during the years fo llo w in g the creation o f the new
audiovisual law un til 2004.

The majority o f my research is qualitative, analyzing

governm ental actions towards satellite stations and the resulting change in the content o f
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those stations. I also look at self-censorship and the choices these stations make facing
governmental pressure. I utilize my own field interviews as well as relevant literature to
compile a comprehensive analysis o f these changes. M y sources range from newspaper
coverage and analysis, to books relevant to the study, as well as various specialized
journal articles, Georgetown U niversity’ s “ Arab Information Project,” and the online
Transnational Broadcasting Journal.

I also use interviews w ith executives from

televisions to get a grasp on the strategies and proposed mission o f satellite televisions,
and understand the dynamics between these media and the government.
This study w ill be divided into two main parts, further organized into different
subdivisions.

The first part w ill provide a literature review that discusses satellite

televisions and the schools o f thought that see it as a new and vibrant Public Sphere or
otherwise; It also includes a history of media and satellite televisions in Lebanon and the
Arab world in general, dividing this chapter into regional and thematic subdivisions, and
comparing Lebanese media w ith its Arab counterpart, and the latter’ s effect on Lebanese
satellite television; F inally, the second part consists of a longitudinal analysis o f the latest
developments that occurred subsequent to the creation of the audiovisual law in 1994 up
until 2004, and an analysis o f the implementation of the various media laws put in place,
and the subsequent findings and conclusions one can draw from these events.

Relevant Literature
Freedom o f the press is a basic criterion for determining i f there is a democracy in
a country. (Ungar, 1990) For many schools of thought, press freedom is a catalyst of
other freedoms, a step towards fu ll democratization. Furthermore, it is also seen as one of
the most important elements needed in order to define a country as democratic. Another
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school of thought, on the other hand, focuses on the ideological role of the systems o f
communication, and does not take their mere existence in a society at face value.
Therefore, any consideration o f democracy and conflict must begin with an analysis o f
systems o f communication, and a study o f their structure and content. For Raboy and
Dagenais, “ the media-crisis relationship becomes a key factoring the struggle fo r
democracy, and media constitute a contested terrain in the struggles surrounding
conceptualization, definitions and transformation o f society in different parts of the w orld.
(Alleyne, 1994)
There has been a wide array o f literature that studies the New Media and the N ew
Public Sphere that it supposedly creates, especially in the region of the Middle East. For
example, one o f the most prominent scholars on the subject is Jon Anderson, who studies
the New Media and places the Internet and satellite television in the context o f other
"down-market technologies" such as cassettes, leafleting, magazines, and telephones. He
contrasts these with the "old media," i.e. traditional state monopolies on television, radio
and newspapers, which are designed to promote nation-building in authoritarian states.
The old media, in Anderson’ s opinion, are known as "state theatres" and have provoked
suspicion, social aloofness and conspiracy theories among receivers. By contrast, the
New Media is beginning to de-monopolize the content and understanding of inform ation
in the Arab world, according to a number o f scholars including Anderson him self.
Therefore, the common trend in

this

school o f thought is that “ Down-m arket”

inform ation technologies w ill eventually bring a variety o f controversial and im portant
issues into every Arabic livin g room, therefore liberalizing and revolutionizing the
existing status quo.
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Another school of thought is more pessimistic

towards

the impact of

communication technologies. Jon Alterman, for example, cast the information revolution
in the Arab world in the context of the overall globalization process, and draws a
distinction between the globalization of information, which erodes censorship and spurs
the

democratization

of

information,

and

the

globalization

of

style

— the

"McDonaldization" o f the world — which benefits only the producers of fashionable
products. W hile the globalization of information is beneficial in general, it is relatively
difficu lt to participate in it effectively due to the overwhelming volume o f information
available, and the lim its of ownership that satellite technologies in particular offer. On the
other hand, participation in the globalization of style is much easier, as it merely requires
the purchase of a product, such as a subscription for cable or the installation of a dish.
In these terms, Alterman is less optimistic about the spread of information
technology throughout the Arab world, noting a number o f regional constraints. Limited
English literacy and a shortage of technical skills and a low GDP per capita in some
countries are the main obstacles which Alterman expects to restrain IT growth in Arab
countries, though it is not the case in all Arab countries.

Other obstacles include the

political systems in these Arab countries, mostly ruled by Kings, dictators, and lifelong
presidents who dread opposing views.

Therefore Alterman believes that change starts

within the society, not through mass media, and also notes how information technology
can be destabilizing. He hypothesizes that information technologies may further the
division o f the small, “ techno-savvy elites” from the rest o f a population that lacks
technology, access, and skills, and increased usage o f information technology by
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"cultural authenticity" movements to promote their message, coexist w ith the rise of
hybrid identities spurred on by inform ation globalization.1
Nabil Dajani further discusses this idea of segmentation and the power o f the elite
in the Lebanese case in particular: He argues that Lebanese television channels are more
characteristically tools fo r pursuing sectarian interests in the Lebanese perspective rather
than furthering a broadly "Lebanese" agenda. This pattern became exaggerated during
the Lebanese c iv il w ar and, subsequently, new legislation successfully reduced the
number of permitted stations. However, Dajani argues, Lebanese television remains a
tool of sectarian elites and is virtu ally devoid of programming beneficial for national
development. Instead, it is mostly fille d with European, Syrian, Egyptian and American
movies, soap operas and other light entertainment. Dajani furthers his argument even
more by suggesting that subscriptions to the satellite channels are driven far more by
entertainment than by p o litica l and news programs. Moreover, even w ith the freedom
some satellite televisions have, the restrictions imposed on them when it comes to
discussing certain taboo issues are many and further impedes any change possible.

Point of study
Consequently, I argue that broadcast media have produced new public spheres
and spaces for inform ation, debate, and participation that contain both the potential to
stimulate democracy and to augment the dissemination o f critical ideas, as w ell as new
possibilities for m anipulation, social control, and the promotion o f pro-govemmental
positions. The example o f Lebanese satellite televisions is particularly pertinent in view
of the false image it gives o f a free media w ith no lim its on its discourse, w hile the reality
is different and reaches the extent o f closing down stations as w e ll as physical and
1 Arab Information Project lecture [On-line] www.georgetown.edu/research/arabtech
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psychological threats on journalists. The control that the Lebanese government exercises
on these means of communication is ju s tifie d w ith a number of reasons, m ainly internal
security, Lebanon’ s image abroad, and preserving ties with brotherly countries.

The

main powerbroker in this equation is Syria, a country that has been an occupation force
fo r some, and a savior for others, fo r more than twenty years.

Other powerbrokers

include Saudi Arabia, which plays a m ajor role in securing and offering investments to
post-war Lebanon. Some politicians in the Lebanese government also regularly use the
war with Israel as yet another reason fo r government censorship, and many justifications
fo r imprisonment and other actions have been justified by the official line “ dealing w ith
the enemy.” These elements and other regional considerations turn the Lebanese “ free”
and “ new” press more of an old medium in a new disguise than a revolutionary process o f
democratization.

Significance
Actually, the case of Lebanon is important because it combines the tw o extremes
the development of new technology in communication could lead to: it could help
citizens revitalize democracy, or lure them into a surrogate for democratic dialogue.
There is a fine line between the two, and understanding the Lebanese case is strongly
relevant to prevent the latter on a w ider A rabic level because of its deep history o f media
development.

Lebanon is also an example o f how Arab states use indirect means o f

control as opposed to obvious means o f repression when the latter means fails to w ork.
In other words, Arab governments have gotten used to fight those who are against them
by follow ing the same tactics that the opposing side does; in effect, it seems that
governments choose the option of investing in satellite television as a counterattack and
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as a way to allow people to vent without creating much change, instead of having to deal
with an actual creation of a civil society that promotes national dialogue and the
possibility of change. Moreover, often in studies scholars have tended to put the internet
and satellite television within the same category, therefore rendering their significance
equal in force instead and impact, and not putting enough importance on each medium as
a unique and different experiment in communication and free speech.

9

Chapter 1: Literature
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When the term communication is used, it is often used in close association w ith
information. This is understandable, because the Latin roots of both words suggest that
they possess valuable potentialities. It is significant that communication and com munity
both share the Latin root communis, meaning common. From this root we got the other
Latin word communicare, meaning “ to make common to many, share, impart, divide.”
(Alleyne, 1994) Therefore, inherent to the definition of communication is the idea o f
sharing.

And one of the definitions o f community is common character, identity, and

background. This means communication is essential for the creation of something known
as a community at both the domestic and international levels. Moreover, communication
is conceived as a process that must be in place for any distribution of information to
occur. And, in addition, communication is seen as the medium that promotes the right to
hold and impart ideas, which is a fundamental principle of any credible democracy.

Communication and Democracy

Communication in modem democracies can be broadly divided into two main
notions: the first one being that there is the democratized media or participatory media
that includes the new media such as satellite television and computer-related media and
can be termed alternative; and the second is that there are social movements and groups
who use these media actively fo r social change. (Dahlgren, 1995) Notions o f the public
sphere first started with Habermas, and have been developed by other researchers such as
Garnham (1986), Cohen (1985), Curran (1991), Scannel (1989), Blunder (1992), Keane
(1991), and Tomlinson (1991). These notions have been picked up on by all media and
political communication researchers studying many regions and aspects o f the public
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sphere. In his milestone book, The Structural Transform ation o f the P u b lic Sphere (1989),
Habermas develops the normative notion o f the public sphere as a part of social life
where citizens can exchange views on matters o f importance to the common good, so that
public opinion can be formed. This public sphere comes into being when people gather to
discuss issues o f political concern.

The Notion o f Public Sphere

W ith the term Public Sphere, I refer to com m unicative exchanges and relations
which focus on subjects o f political interest, in w hich the institutions o f political power
and the institutions o f mass media mainly, but not solely, interact w ith each other. Public
sphere, in other words, is where people gather in fo rm a lly to discuss the formal structures
o f society and government. It is the context where c iv il society flourishes and becomes
active in criticizin g and elaborating on the different issues pertaining to the public realm.

For Habermas, the public sphere is "a discursive arena that is home to citizen
debate, deliberation, agreement and action.” (V illa , 1992) Habermas' earlier work relies
on a description o f a historical moment during the 17th and 18th centuries when coffee
houses, societies and salons became the center o f debate, and he extends these arguments
to an ideal o f participation in the public sphere in today’ s w orld . D uring the era o f the
Enlightenment and 18th century democratic revolutions, public spheres emerged where
individuals could discuss and debate issues o f com mon concern. (Habermas, 1989)
Habermas argues that a small-scale press is vital to the development o f a participatory
public and to related notions o f citizenship. However, because Habermas attributed this
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activity to the merchant m iddle classes who were literate and com m ercially independent,
his theory is sometimes referred to as the bourgeois public sphere.

W ith the emergence o f the welfare state in the twentieth century Habermas noted
the further transformations o f the public sphere. In his view , jo u rn a lis m ’ s critica l role in
the wake o f advertising, entertainment, and public relations becomes muted, and public
opinion is no longer a process o f rational discourse but the result o f p u b lic ity and social
engineering in the media. Habermas’ analysis is truly ambitious and largely com pelling,
yet there remain some areas o f d iffic u lty in the point o f view o f many o f his critics. It
can be argued that even the discourse o f the bourgeois public sphere at its zenith never
manifested the high level o f reasoned discourse he suggests, and furtherm ore that the
situation under advanced capitalism is not as bleak and locked as he asserts.
The other significant public sphere theory comes from the p o litic a l scientist
Hanna Arendt. In her m a jo r w ork, The Human C ondition (1958), she offers a critique o f
the mass society and the loss o f public realm. W hile Habermas m a in ly analyses the
modem bourgeois p u b lic sphere to develop his normative model, A ren dt focuses on the
public realm in the Greek polis. However, Arendt and Habermas both agree on the loss o f
distinction between the public and private spheres and the negative effects o f this process
on public sphere. T h ey both criticize the mass society, w ith w hich they associate the
decline o f the public sphere and the creation o f an industrialized society where the public
sphere is controlled b y diffe ren t external factors.

Habermas C ritics
In effect, the m ain criticism o f the w ork o f Habermas is the fact that he lim its his
observations to the burgeoning bourgeois atmosphere that culm inated in a very liv e ly
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bourgeois society. This is why Kluge (1997) argues that the public sphere Habermas
envisions is just a forum for the bourgeoisie, and that it does not represent all o f
society. Therefore, Kluge argued fo r the existence o f a counter public sphere, which
includes those that are not part o f the bourgeois public sphere, and thus could not use the
same medium that the bourgeois have access to. In his theory, there is a public sphere for
the bourgeois and one for the proletariat, and the existence of a bourgeois public sphere
w ith lim ited access does not mean the emancipation or freedom of expression o f the other
sections of society. Brecht’ s idea o f a many-to-many communication device is an attempt
to bridge these two theories. Through his device, Bertolt Brecht envisions a w ay to
include everyone into the public sphere, and to encourage greater discourse w ith in the
exiting lim ited public sphere, such as coffeehouses.
Habermas's ideas is further argued in Adorno’ s (1991) idea o f a culture industry:
Habermas claims that institutions that previously only published news —such as
newspapers, magazines, radio, and television— have turned into "bearers and leaders o f
public opinion." In other words, that these media shape the ideas o f those who have
access to them. This sentiment coincides w ith Adorno's belief in a culture industry, in
which he stipulates that this industry creates images and feeds ideology to the
masses. Thus, the people who earlier on ly reported the news, are now creating the news,
and Habermas may see this as beneficial because it increases discourse w ithin the public
sphere and promotes dialectic between the different parts o f society, but Adorno argues
the opposite, saying that this culture industry could only restrict the discussion in the
public sphere, because it lim its it to those who have the power to use these devices, and
thus it dictates on those with lesser powers what to think.
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Moreover, these “ centers of debate” that mass media create, as Habermas
theorized, were at some point important to social movements because they took the form
o f rational-critical debates, with a set of rules, including avoiding the use of emotion or
emotive language, and focusing on the rationality o f the content alone. In this context, it
is the common interest, and the search for the truth, that prevails in the discussions. This
entails the need fo r a conscientious media with a responsible and truthful background, not
one that distorts and uses its powerful effect to promote its own interests. Habermas
therefore emphasizes the critical role of the media in the public sphere, distinguishing
between the early press that highlighted political controversy and the more recent
development o f media, which turn the news into a com m odity. Habermas outlines the
development o f newspapers in the early 17th century, com m enting that the press "was for
the firs t time established as a genuinely critical organ o f a public engaged in critical
political debate: as the fourth estate." (Habermas, 1989:60)
However, although this might have been the case in England, it was not the norm
in other countries. And, moreover, many of the old centers o f the public sphere still exist,
but are mere strongholds for governmental control and nation-building, especially with
respect to developing countries.

Many theorists have commented that television and

other electronic communications further isolate people fro m one another and "substituted
themselves fo r older spaces o f politics," (Thornton, 1996) instead o f bringing about a
healthy public sphere fo r the exchange o f ideas. A lso, instead o f reporting on politics, the
media are becoming active participants in the p o litic a l process through their role in
pu blicity, and the selectivity o f news reporting. Increasingly, the media has become
central to political life and not only a bearer o f truth fo r the common good.
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Nevertheless, public
resemblance

to

the

debate on television and in newspapers bears little

rational-critical

debate idealized by

Habermas.

Events

are

manipulated to provide the maximum televisual impact, and debates and talk shows are
structured so that extreme points of view can clash to maximum effect, increasing ratings
but doing little to contribute to the formation of discursive public opinion.

Moreover,

topic selection reflects the pressures o f commercial, political, and proprietal interests, and
programs can be viewed as providing an illusion of participation, which encourages
citizens to feel as though their democratic rights are being exercised. This does not mean
that mass media is not seen by some as a gateway to democratic participation. Curran
(1991) argues how traditional media could play a democratic role in society by acting as
an agency o f representation. He suggests that media should be structured to allow diverse
social groups to express their views. However, analyzing the democratic effect o f these
media cannot be carried out only through studying ratings and market shares, but also
through studying the process in which programs are structured and put on the air, and
what forces are responsible fo r controlling them.

Studying the Impact of Television
The process w ith which to study the impact of mass media in general, and
television in particular, on the building o f a healthy democratic public sphere is not
limited only to an in-depth study o f each o f the phases of television production, it also
must take into account the evolution o f external influence and the general context. These
are factors such as the political situation, cultural situation, communications media, and
the dynamics o f the audio-visual market. (Sala 2001) Such a study must also take into
account the background o f each media, the laws that regulate it, and ownership status. As
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a matter o f fact, “ each society has to reinvent broadcasting in its own image as a means o f
containing and suppressing the geographical, political, spiritual, and social dilemmas
which broadcasting entails.” 2
Quite a few studies have been dedicated to comparative studies o f communication
systems and media in different countries and formats, and, in all these studies, members
o f the public sphere must, especially those in the media, adhere to certain rules fo r an
'ideal speech situation' to occur. They are as follows: Every subject with the competence
to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse; Everyone is allowed to question
any assertion whatever; Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the
discourse; Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs; No speaker
may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid
down before. (Villa, 1992) I f all these rules are set in place, then television is really a
democratic medium that provides equal access to all and helps everyone in attaining their
goals, no matter what they are. H ow ever, we still have along way to go to achieve a real
freedom o f access and speech in television as a whole, especially in developing countries
where the government has a strong control over media.

Does Television E ntail Democracy?
There are among scholars and media observers those who regard television as a
genuinely democratic medium w ith the capacity to bring politics into the houses o f
voters, thus enabling them to be critica l. B ut on the other hand there are those who
consider that television com m odifies politics into short 'image bites', and that television
campaigns tend to bypass jou rna lists through the use o f 'managed' political events.

2. Quote form Anthony Smith, President o f the Magdalen College at Oxford, and once a program editor for the BBC
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Television is also seen as a medium that promotes a certain trend’ s point of view, while
suppressing the other, because o f the financial o r p o litic a l lim itations imposed on the
medium. However, Habermas is not as worried about analyzing questions o f ownership
and control. He introduced the idea of the public sphere, describing it as a forum for
public opinion, and as a mediator between the private and state spheres. Through the
public sphere, individuals can exercise political co n tro l and create discourse. Habermas
maintains that access should be guaranteed fo r all citizens. However, he also maintains
that “ rational citizens” are a prerequisite fo r such a forum to succeed, making public
access more restricted than what he in itia lly argues for.

He does not take into

consideration the financial reality of starting a m edium that is tru ly expensive, nor does
he seem to take the masses into account. Newspapers, magazines, radio, and television
act as the media fo r a “ rationally-restricted” public sphere only.
Nonetheless, in its European origins, the free press was inspired by ideas of
natural rights and citizenship in respect o f m onarchy and rulers fo llo w in g Locke’ s theory,
a legal tradition which sought to lim it state power, secular views based on rationalism
and free thought rather than religious doctrine, and a b e lie f in a pluralist 'marketplace of
ideas' and diversity o f information based on econom ic laissez-faire principles. Moreover,
M ilto n was perhaps the most celebrated o f those preceding writers who triumphantly
argued the case fo r press freedom, giving a num ber o f reasons to why licensing and
censorship was counter-productive: It was not in the tradition o f free speech; people
should be considered mature enough to discern good fro m e vil; even the Bible would
have to be censored because that book contained tales o f both good and evil; objective
truth is that w hich is tested by contrary points o f view ; the government is assuming
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in fa llib ility when deciding whether a medium is “ good” or not; and, fin a lly , the people
might not be as enthusiastic to defend their government in times o f foreign attack.
(Alleyne, 1994) Furthermore, M ill reaffirmed that “ there is a lim it to the legitimate
interference o f collective opinion w ith individual independence: and to fin d that lim it,
and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition o f human
affairs, as protection against p o litica l despotism.” (M ill, 1859, in A cton 1972: 73)

Interactive Media: Beyond Traditional Boundaries
Earlier in the century, John Dewey envisaged developing a newspaper that would
convey "thought news," bringing all the latest ideas in science, technology, and the
intellectual w orld to a general public, which would also promote democracy. (Czitrom ,
1982) In addition, B erto lt Brecht and W alter Benjamin (Benjam in, 1969) perceived the
radical potential o f innovative technologies similar to film and radio and advocated the
seizure of these new forces o f production, in order to "re-function" them, and to turn them
into instruments to democratize and revolutionize society. Sartre too w orked on radio and
television series and insisted that "committed writers must get into these relay station arts
of the movies and radio." (Sartre, 1974: 177)
In fact, effective use o f technology is essential in contem porary p o litics and that
those who wish

to

intervene

in

the new public

spheres need to

deploy new

communications media to participate in democratic debate and to shape the future o f
contemporary

societies

and

culture.

As

a matter o f

fact,

new

com m unication

technologies, especially satellite T V , now seem to serve the purpose o f revolutionizing
societies. Tyrannical behavior can supposedly be exposed, dissident opinions can be
aired, and public opinion can be relayed back to governments. Nonetheless, I argue that
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broadcast media like radio and television, and now computers, have produced new public
spheres and spaces for inform ation, debate, and participation that contain the potential to
invigorate democracy and to increase the dissemination o f critical and new ideas.

In

addition to this great potential is the risk o f finding new possibilities fo r manipulation,
social control, and the promotion o f pro-government and stagnant positions.
Participation in these new public spheres all requires critical persons to gain new
technical skills and to master new technologies. It also requires enabling access to those
who do not have the means to promote their views in the traditional means o f
communication. However, the mere existence o f this new public sphere does not
consequently im ply more freedom and more access by everyone. In effect, the "New
Media" as we know it are no longer "Mass Media". Mass media, in the traditional sense
o f sending a lim ited number o f messages to a homogenous mass audience, was replaced
by the new media in which the m u ltip lic ity o f messages and sources can be sent and the
audience itself becomes more selective. Therefore, there is evolution from a "mass
society" to a "segmented society," and the Lebanese experience with Satellite televisions
is one example o f this “ segregation.”

The New Public Sphere in Lebanon
As we w ill see in the fo llo w in g chapter, the Lebanese media experience is a
complex matter which projects a m ulti-layered reality o f the traditional Public Sphere
Habermas and others refer to.

In Habermas’ view, it is spaces sim ilar to satellite

televisions that enabled critical th in kin g and paved the way towards more freedom o f
expression and interactive debate.

However, the Lebanese structure and experience

cannot be only seen as a promoter o f the freedom o f speech and a “ bearer o f opinion.” In
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fact, many other elements come into play in the Lebanese case, one of them being the
sectarian structure of media, its elitist ownership control, and the regional players that
influence its broadcast. Actually, the Lebanese experience goes beyond the criticisms of
Adorno and Brecht and the need for an interactive media, because the former offers
interactivity, but is nonetheless still tied down to its regional and local realities. Dajani
offers an extensive study of the Lebanese case in his book Disoriented Media in a

Fragm ented Society: the Lebanese Experience (D ajani, 1992), where he observes and
analyses the sectarian and elitist structure o f the Lebanese society. However, his book
was published prior to the audiovisual laws o f 1994 and 1996, and before the airing of the
first satellite broadcasts in 1996. Moreover, ownership is rarely discussed in similar later
studies, although it explains a big part of the media reality in Lebanon. Furthermore, the
recent developments play a an even more important part in studying and understanding
where the supposed Lebanese Public Sphere is heading towards, because of new
ownership, mergers, and governmental interferences that I w ill analyze later in this study.
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Chapter 2: Lebanese and Arab Media and
Satellite History
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O f the 22 countries that constitute the Arab world, Lebanon is by far one o f the
most liberal countries, whether it is through its liberal market or its society.

The

Lebanese media has furthermore been a pioneer in distributing information freely, despite
the various limitations put in place by the Ottoman, French, and current Lebanese
administration. Lebanese journalists have been known to write their opinion regardless
o f pressures from governments, and have also been known to exile themselves fo r the
purpose o f keeping their “ pens” free. Numerous have fled to Egypt and the United States
under the Ottoman and French rule, and the many that stayed have always defied
oppression and been punished fo r it.

Nevertheless, Lebanon remains a country where

freedoms are limited and undermined despite all the efforts made to overcome this
situation.

This is why it offers a great example fo r this study: Lebanon has acquired

means o f communication that are not government-controlled by definition, which would
fit them into the liberal trade theory o f commercial means of communication controlled
by independent capital and advertising revenues, and therefore free.
complex structure of these “ independent”

However, the

means o f communication makes them

vulnerable to the traditional means o f control, m ainly by the government. A nd this is
furthermore exacerbated w ith the emergence o f the new means o f communication that
constitute a greater responsibility to the traditional power structure.

Lebanon’s “ Special Freedoms”
Although part of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon was given a special “ protocol” in
1861 that assured the preservation o f freedom in its territories. This protocol was signed
by England, Russia, France, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire, and only included the area
o f Mount Lebanon. However, the early print media misused these rights to promote a
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certain ethnic and religious message and spoke fo r one group to the detriment of the
others and thus could not be defined as either objective or journalistic in the professional
sense o f the word. Ironically, this is how mass media in Lebanon is viewed and operates
u n til this day, despite its ancient myth that the media promote freedom of speech. As a
matter o f fact, Dajani and other scholars refer to the year 1916 as the turning point when
media censorship made it clear that it reached its peak: the year when 16 journalists were
hanged in Damascus for influencing public opinion. (Dajani 1992) The hanging came
under the last vestiges of the Ottoman rule, w hich was known to be oppressive and brutal,
before the end o f W orld War I and the beginning o f a hopeful new era. Many journalists
that had fled to Egypt thought the French mandate w ill improve this situation, and had
high hopes fo r returning to their home country.

However, by 1920, the French mandate was taking a more tangible and colonialist
form and did not change the situation but further restricted freedom o f the press: 250
publications were discontinued by the end o f the French mandate that lasted from 1920
up u n til 1946. (Kamalipour and Mowlana, 1994) A lso, gaining independence from the
French did not generate freedom o f speech nor did it improve the conditions of the
Lebanese media as was thought early on. A c tu a lly , the established French laws remained
in practice un til 1953; 7 years after the last French soldier withdrew from the Lebanese
territory. Moreover, the decree put into w ritin g that year further banned the issuance of
new licenses fo r publications as long as a certain number o f dailies and weeklies were
maintained, and it was not until 1962 that an o ffic ia l Lebanese press law was established,
and it only covered print media.

This law prohibited the publication o f news that

endangers the national security or unity or frontiers o f the state or that degrade a foreign
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head of state. (K am alipour and Mowlana, 1994) This vague law is s till in use today and
decides what can be aired or published, and is the basis o f self-censorship o f all
journalists in all media fields. Moreover, the chaotic events that Lebanon went through
and is still going through made national security the perfect excuse fo r the Lebanese
government to interfere and exercise its controlling power on mass media, despite the
continuous efforts o f the latter to rise above censorship, and despite the commercial
nature of television.

Furthermore, though Lebanese television started as a private

commercial venture, it developed into a replica of Lebanese society that could never
overcome its lim itations.

Television as a Private Enterprise
The French government in Lebanon was the first en tity that established the
country’ s radio broadcast service in 1937, and it was then transferred directly to the
Lebanese government in 1946.

The story of Lebanese television is quite different.

Contrary to the development o f other Arab countries, the firs t television company that
was founded on Lebanese soil was a private enterprise run by tw o Lebanese businessmen
in agreement w ith the Lebanese government. This, Dajani insists, is the “ Lebanese
television's main weakness, fo r the logic of a commercial enterprise in the developing
countries often runs counter to that o f public service and societal w e ll being.” (Dajani
1992:91)
Other schools o f thought runs counter to this argument, stating that freedom of
the media w orldw ide go hand in hand w ith free-market capitalism .

In effect, it was a

combination between private enterprise and government that led to the inauguration of
the first television.

The endeavor to set up television broadcasting in Lebanon started
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October 1954 when two Lebanese businessmen, Wissam Izzedine and Alec Arida, put
forward a request to form a television broadcasting company with the financial help of
the French government. An agreement was signed on August 1956 after two years of
negotiations, and consequently La Compagnie Libanaise de Television (C LT) was bom.
However, the license was not a monopoly as the applicants had requested, but it
authorized them to broadcast television signals on two VHF channels, one in Arabic and
the other in French. The first commercial television station in the Arab world station
inaugurated its service on May 28, 1959.
However, the agreement signed with the government predetermined that the
television would remain under official government inspection, and would not be
permitted to broadcast programs that would threaten “ public security, morals, religious
groups, or enhance the image of any political personality or party.” (Dajani, 2001) This
broad form of restriction is what mainly characterizes the relationship between the
government and television stations today, whether it comes through voluntary or forced
censorship. Under the conditions o f C LT ’ s contract, television programs were restricted
to education and entertainment only. It allowed the company a certain appearance of
political expression, as superficial as it can be, but was quite generous in giving it all the
time it needed for advertising: advertising messages could cover up to 25 per cent o f the
total broadcast time. (Dajani, 1992)

Finally, the agreement also required that the

company should broadcast, free o f charge, news programs and official bulletins
submitted by the Ministry of Information. Additionally, television was to be subject to
all laws and regulations relevant to the rights of the press and of authors, as well as all
national and international laws and regulations dealing with wireless communication and
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broadcasting. The contract was signed for 15 years at the end of which the government
had the right to buy the television’s installations.

Another group of Lebanese businessmen, backed by the American network ABC,
approached the government with a request to set up a second television station,
Compagnie de Television du Liban et du Proche-Orient — Tele Orient. In the case of
Tele Orient, transmission began on May 6, 1962, under an agreement similar to the one
granted to CLT, and with programming similar to C LT in Arabic, English, and French.
However, a tough competition and a lack of adequate organization, especially in selling
advertising time, plagued the two television companies the first decade of their existence.
This drove both companies to join forces and develop similar advertising sales techniques,
and to coordinate the programming and marketing o f their programs. Until the beginning
o f the c ivil war in 1975, the two companies succeeded in making large amounts of profit
and revenue from television advertising, and total television income from advertising
showed a 19.5 per cent increase over 1973 and constituted 35.3 per cent of total 1974
advertising expenditure in Lebanon. (Dajani, 2001) Additionally, both companies sold
locally produced programs to television institutions in the Arab countries.

In December 1974 the Lebanese Council o f Ministers renewed the license of CLT
fo r a period of nine years only, and the new agreement sought to institutionalize and
formalize the political control of broadcasting by the government. Under the terms of the
new agreement, the Lebanese government had the authority to buy the transmission
installations and lease them to CLT, and two government censors were to be permanently
present at the station. The agreement also stipulated CLT would broadcast a daily one-
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hour early evening program prepared by the government. It further required that CLT
pay 6.5% o f its net advertising revenue to the government and authorized a maximum of
nine minutes o f advertising per hour, with a maximum of three minutes during news
programs. The 1974 agreement also made general requests that T V programs should be
"of the highest possible standards" and that CLT should "train its staff in the artistic and
technical fields." (Dajani, 1992: 96)

However, not only were the clauses in the agreement too vague to be applied
fully, but also the outbreak of the civil war a year later paralyzed the government’ s
institutions and made it even harder to follow the contract’ s rules and regulations.
Nonetheless, this did not prevent the government from initiating a similar agreement in
December 1977 that tied Tele Orient to similar obligations, although failing to implement
them in their entirety as well.

Damages of the C ivil W ar

The first two years o f the civil war were seriously damaging and challenging for
the two television companies: The war reduced advertising drastically, and both
companies incurred heavy losses. The two television stations were able to keep their
transmissions going and to prevent their equipment from being damaged, but producing
programs was a hard thing to do under these circumstances.

On March 11, 1976, an

unsuccessful coup d'etat led by Brigadier General Abdel Aziz al-Ahdab led militias from
both sides to occupy both stations, which made production totally impossible and
consequently divided the news rhetoric on both sides to suit the factions’ affiliations.
Consequently, the news program in the west Beirut station in Tallet al-Khayyat showed
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great support for the M uslim "nationalist forces" while that in the east Beirut station
supported the President Suleiman Franjieh's Christian supporters. (Dajani, 2002, Dajani,
1992, Rugh, 1987)

General Ahdab also took over the medium wave and FM radio

transmitters, and both the radio and television in West Beirut broadcast pro-Ahdab
newscasts each night.

Meanwhile, Franjieh's supporters refused to let him resign and

continued to control short-wave radio transmitters and Hazmieh's Tele Liban branch.
(Rugh, 1987)

The split of the broadcast media also generated escalation in the war because
each faction targeted the transmission and equipment of the opponent’ s television.
Moreover, transmission was also badly affected by chronic power failures, which,
combined with all other factors, incurred heavy losses on both companies and pushed
them on the verge of bankruptcy. This escalation in events necessitated seeking secure
financial assistance from the government, which the companies did when they requested
the interference of the government at the end o f 1976. At that point a new president,
Elias Sarkis, was elected and the pace of hostilities apparently diminished. Elope was
growing among people that this new government could bring the end of the c iv il war.

Following the televisions’ request, any decision taken by the new government
could either destroy television in Lebanon or strengthen it and use it to promote the
institutions of the government and national dialogue.

At this point in time, the

government viewed television as another tool for nation-building, at a time when war was
destroying national unity. However, i f it agreed to extend aid, the new regime would also
have to aid other institutions affected by the war, and it did not have the means and
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resources to do so. To answer these urgent questions a special committee was formed
under the auspices of the Council of Ministers to study the conditions of television in
Lebanon.

The committee was charged w ith the task o f making recommendations to

maintain the operation of this medium and preserve it, thus promoting national dialogue.
(Dajani, 1992) A t the end, the committee's report urged the Lebanese government to take
a more active role in the development of television and recommended merging CLT and
Tele Orient into a new company controlled mostly by the government, while the private
sector would control the remaining portion; it further recommended that the two existing
companies be given the option to purchase the shares of the public sector. The Council
o f Ministers approved the report and a legislative decree was issued on December 30,
1977, legalizing the birth of a new television company, the Lebanese Television
Company — Tele Liban. The company was formed "to manage, organize and utilize the
various television transmitting installations, and to undertake all commercial and
television production tasks." (Dajani, 1992: 199) Tele Liban was to be managed by a
board of directors of twelve members: six representing the Lebanese government and the
remaining six representing the two companies, w hile the chairman of the board was to be
appointed by the Lebanese Council of Ministers.

Accordingly, the financial assistance given by the government not only made it
possible to rebuild and improve the existing transmitters in order to cover all the
Lebanese territory, but it also increased the hours o f transmission. However, this change
further strengthened the official Lebanese policy, which consisted mainly of seeking to
legalize censorship of television programs in order to keep this medium under control by
lim itin g its political influence.” The function o f Tele Liban, according to an official at the
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Ministry o f Information, was "to bring together the best of what the public sector had to
offer -in terms o f its primary concern for the needs of the country- and the strength of the
private sector in dynamic management and profit making." (Dajani, 2001)

However,

both government and the private sector, which jointly managed television under the Tele
Liban plan, continued to provide programs that were determined by their private political
or economic interests more than by the public interest.

N ot a single local television

program addressed the serious sectarian problem that plagued the Lebanese society and
was one of the main causes o f the civil war. And while television, and the print media in
general, apparently gave their audiences an "over-dose" o f political discussions, there
always has been an almost total absence of public affairs programming and lack of
investigative reporting about issues that affect the livelihood o f the average Lebanese —
such as the shortage of water and electricity supplies. (Dajani, 2001) Habermas’ idea of
the creation of a Public Sphere that would promote national dialogue was rendered in the
Lebanese case into a commercial venture that is oblivious o f the realities of civil war and
the fragmentation o f civil society, and no government action would be able to stop the
drastic changes that were to come.

The Mushrooming of Illegal Media Stations

Furthermore, what escalated to become a 15 years o f c iv il war in Lebanon
destabilized the whole system and shook the existing structures o f mass media as
established earlier in the century. The war decentralized all the major institutions,
including mass media, even with the creation of an o fficia l governmental television
station. The events that occurred during the war weakened the operation of public media
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institutions, both radio and television, and strengthened private ventures instead. Thus,
following the divisions that occurred on the state level, private militias, political parties,
and others showed interest in sponsoring several television and radio station, as well as
newspapers and magazines. As Hammoud and A fifi say, “ the opportunity to distribute often biased - information illegally through mass media channels without penalty was too
attractive for most political parties to ignore.” (Kamalipour and Mowlana, 1994: 161)
Moreover, the divisions that occurred on the geographical level also instigated the need
for television and radio that go beyond the traditional boundaries, and controlling those
means permitted different political parties to send their message to others. These
televisions and radio stations worked as satellite television do today, sending messages
across boundaries to reach people from other “ countries” and “ societies.” As a result, the
worsening of the state of affairs in Lebanon and the further deterioration o f the central
government during the Amin Jemayel presidency in the mid 1980s encouraged some of
the warring factions to establish their own pirate television stations, which resulted in a
mushrooming of televisions overnight, with one main objective: spreading each faction’ s
ideology while undermining the others’ .
Most important among these new televisions was the Lebanese Broadcasting
Company (LBC), which was the official organ of the Christian m ilitia the “ Lebanese
Forces,” and Al-Mashrek Television, established by politicians opposed to the regulars of
LBC, mainly the Syrian Nationalist Party. Also among the important pirate stations at
the time was the New Television (N TV) established by the Lebanese communist party
and later bought by independent businessman Tahseen Khayyat and other independents.
LBC went on the air in August 1985 and quickly captured the interest of a wide array o f
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viewers in terms of entertainment and variety. Al-Mashrek (The Orient) Television began
its experimental broadcasting in 1989 and started airing regular programs in April 1990.
B y the beginning of 1991 it became a serious competitor for both LBC and Tele Liban
and its heavy use of Arabic programs and film s attracted large audiences.

New

Television began its transmission in A pril 1991 and aired programs that had no
relationship to the ideology of the communist party but were mainly commercial. Other
television stations with more limited coverage included Sigma T V and K ilikia Television,
both based in West Beirut, the Muslim district, and both were only interested in
transmitting music videos and important entertainment programs. (Dajani, 1992)
Moreover, the mushrooming of TV stations in Lebanon did not end here: in the early
1990’ s, C33, Al-Salam TV, TV One, Cable Video Network, and ICN were among a few
other televisions with less impact on the Lebanese audience, while M urr TV and Future
television were the latest additions to the group, with a substantive bigger effect on
Lebanese politics and people.

The creation of de facto television stations faced both the Lebanese government
and the private sector involved with Tele Liban with a new challenge; the deterioration of
the quality of the human element and technical skills at Tele Liban allowed the de facto
stations to easily attract Lebanese viewers to their programs and consequently draw
advertisers to them. Consequently, Tele Liban officials filed a lawsuit requesting large
financial compensation from the three leading de facto stations at the time: LBC, alMachrek, and NTV.

However, all television stations, including Tele Liban, were

generally indifferent to the public needs for the coverage of subjects that relate to their
livelihood, such as the problems of the shortage of electricity and water, pollution, and

33

the high cost o f living. Instead, these stations focused on engaging in an ideological war
between the various factions, and limited itself to representing and attacking political
officials, political parties, and players in the political realm in general. Televisions were
also highly biased in covering news of the raging war that was going on.

During the famous 1989 Taif agreement, Lebanese members o f the parliament
were able to arrive at a regionally and internationally supported accord that marked the
end of the Lebanese c iv il war. The Taif Agreement, which was later incorporated in the
Lebanese constitution, called for the reorganization o f the media in Lebanon, among
other more important “ co-existence” clauses. The deliberations o f members of the
parliament called for legalizing the existing de facto radio and television stations and
upon the signing o f this agreement many politicians and businessmen hurried to set up
television stations so as to establish their "right" for a television license. By the end of
1991, 46 television stations were set up in a matter of few months and some ten of the
new stations were on the air, transmitting on UHF channels as all the VHF channels were
already in use. (Dajani, 1992) This state of affairs was the natural extension to what civil
society was going through during the difficult warring years. As a matter of fact, it was
the most natural expansion of the Public Sphere(s) that mushroomed during the war, and
came as a result o f already-present societal segmentation.

The Sectarian Structure of the Media

Like any set o f institutions rooted in a political system, the broadcast media of a
country or region reflect the existing distribution of power, and the T a if agreement
consecrated this power balance, whether in its parliamentary seats’ distribution, or the
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endless effort to balance between the powers of the Maronite President, the Sunni Prime
Minister, and the Shiite Chief o f Parliament. To see how this structural relationship can
result in censorship in the media realm, it is instructive to start by looking at broadcasting
arrangements in Lebanon, since these are potentially the most liberal in the Arab world
and the most divisive on the societal level. In the Lebanese confessional system, political
positions are assigned on the basis of sectarian affiliation, while unified state institutions
take a back seat. Parliamentary seats are divided according to a “ representative” model,
whereby each sect is represented according to a percentage it supposedly holds w ithin the
overall population. Moreover, directors, c iv il servants, diplomats, and even teachers in
public service are chosen according to their faith and political affiliation. The Lebanese
typical college and high school graduates find themselves having to go back to their
religious leaders or political figures that are affiliated with their sect in order to find a job.
In other words, there is no space for qualifications in this state of affairs. In the case of
media in Lebanon today, each private station is linked to a prominent politician or
religious group, and the m ajority of these stations’ employees reflect the sectarian nature
of each station. Furthermore, as we w ill see at a later stage in this study, ownership
reflects not only sectarian but also political and familial affiliations based on sectarian
backgrounds. This element o f the study is the most important in later discussion o f media
status and satellite status in Lebanon, because it is one of the most decisive elements in
how each station makes internal decisions, and how the government interacts w ith each
station.

The Lebanese media situation is an example of the contradictory state of
transformation and persistence that Lebanon is going through. The existing media laws
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specify that television institutions be not directly managed or run by the government or
private individuals or politicians. The practice, however, is different but is congruent with
the special socio-political structure of the Lebanese society.
intrinsically

along sectarian preference, governmental

In a country divided

actions of censorship and

oppression reflect a power balance that is increasingly unequal. Moreover, dividing these
stations along opposition and pro-government lines also show the degree to which the
government allows freedom of speech that is different from its own, and to what degree
the government allows opposition to state its views about the government and its allies.
In addition, internal rifts within the government also play an important role in looking at
these means o f communication and their effect on government and the public, as we w ill
later see. Last but not least, ownership and economic issues also play an important role in
the Lebanese media case because they further reflect the sectarian and political backdrop
and strengthen their stronghold through economic means. Furthermore, the fact that these
politicians seek support from powerful regional players increases the complexity that
they have with the media, creating layers o f censorship that go beyond the local arena.
A ll these issues play a role in the Lebanese media structure, and affect the impact of the
New Media in particular on democracy and freedom o f speech.

Satellite Technology in the Arab W orld

Despite the fact that Lebanon was developed in the media arena, the country’ s
c iv il war prevented the technological development brought by satellite and encouraged
by Arab countries since the late 1960s and up un til the eighties. In fact, Lebanon was a
latecomer in this area, although it later became a powerful player in the area of

36

entertainment. In fact, it was the G ulf that first introduced the medium to countless of
Arabs, a fact that goes counter the theory that says that information technology w ill
revolutionize societies in drastic ways.

Moreover, this New Public Sphere that was

created was first provided for pure entertainment purposes, and in its first stages was only
interactive for entertainment purposes also, which lim ited the area for analytical and
constructive political and social discussions.

Still, the introduction of Satellite broadcasting and the Internet challenged
information control by Arab states in a way that was not possible before.

And this

started not only in the 1990s with the advent of satellite television proliferation, but even
before that w ith the introduction of satellite sending o f printed information to publish
newspapers around the world. W ith this new technology, government and businessman
strived to control Arab audiences in new ways, which created a competitive state of
affairs never before seen in the Arab world. Satellite access was and still is limited to
government bodies and wealthy businessmen, however, which made this information
revolution less powerful than it should have been.
The first major impact o f new satellite technologies on Arab media happened in
the eighties and not in the nineties as is commonly known: It was the satellite-using daily
newspapers, not television, which introduced the idea o f sharing information across
traditional boundaries. First al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper, and later al-Hayat newspaper,
began satellite transmission from London to major population centers throughout the
Arab world. Although owned by private Saudi interests, these papers address themselves
to a pan-Arab audience, and their reporters, editors and columnists reflect that sense of
different Arabic backgrounds. The irony was that in the end it was wealth, generated in a
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conservative Arab country, and not radical Arab ideology such as the Baath party or the
Nasserist that had brought about a pan-Arab press. (Schleifer, 1998) This trend still holds
truth until today, with satellite televisions owned by Saudi individuals and powerful
political and financial elites all over the Arab World.
By the mid-eighties an Arab-states satellite system, called Arabsat, was equipped
and ready to be used, but despite the original provision of transponders potent enough to
send out signals that could be picked up by small dishes, there was no attempt to use the
Arabsat satellites as direct broadcast satellites providing direct broadcast service (DBS)
either to cable, MMDS

and encrypted terrestrial companies retransmitting

the

programming or direct-to-home (DTH) services to the rare but slowly growing number of
homes equipped with dishes. (Schleifer, 1998) Instead, Arabsat satellites were used in
this initial phase for news and public affairs exchanges between existing Arab stateowned national television stations. This meant that the type of news that people received
around the Arab world was mainly news o f official visits of kings and presidents, without
any use of real journalistic skills such as political analysis and investigation. Television
stations were owned by governments, unlike other media that had a slightly wider margin
of freedom. Moreover, the national television channels were extensions o f the ministries
of information, with the exception of television in Lebanon. As a matter o f fact, it is no
accident that in a number o f Arab countries the minister of information operated the
major offices of his ministry from the national television station building. (Schleifer,
1998)
While recent events have put Arab media at the center of w orld politics, the
history of the development o f television satellite broadcasting in the Arab w orld started in
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the early nineties with the second Gulf War, (Am in, 2000; Amin & Boyd, 1994; Barkey,
1996; Kraidy, 1998; Millichip, 1996; Sakr, 1999; Schleifer, 1998) and its rapid growth
was made possible by political and technical developments put in place since the late
1960s. During the second Gulf War, the Arab world experienced what has been defined
by experts as the CNN effect, whereby governments and people in the Arab world
realized the importance of satellite technologies in getting information as well as
controlling it. As a matter of fact, as early as 1967, Arab information ministers expressed
the importance of a satellite network whose objective would be the integration of the
social and cultural activities of the Arab League, a regional organization formed after
W orld War II. Furthermore, the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) was created in
1969 to oversee the establishing of such an organization. Saudi Arabia did not join the
Egypt-led and Cairo-based ASBU until 1974, probably because of the tense relationship
between Saudi Arabia and Egypt at the time.

On A pril 14, 1976, the Arab Satellite

Communications Organization (ARABSAT)

was established under Arab League

jurisdiction, and was entrusted with serving the information, cultural and educational
needs of its members. Saudi Arabia was the main financier of the new organization,
because o f its considerable financial resources expanded by the oil price boom of 1973,
and Riyadh, the Saudi capital, housed its headquarters. (Boyd, 1999)

Today, Saudi

Arabia takes the lead in satellite communication systems in the Arab world.
A fter an unsuccessful launching endeavor by a French Ariane rocket led to the
loss of the first satellite 1-A, the U.S. space shuttle Discovery successfully launched a
second AR ABSAT satellite, 1-B in 1985. (A m in & Boyd, 1994)

ARABSAT then

launched its second generation satellites 2-A and 2-B in July and November, 1996

39

respectively, and the expanded technical capacities o f A R A B S A T 2 were said to give
ARABSAT a competitive edge in the region. (Kazan, 1996)

The third generation of

ARABSAT 3-A satellite was launched in February 1999 and is currently co-located with
2-A. This last satellite is a powerful transmitter with one single transponder covering all
Arab countries, most o f Europe and a good part of Africa. In 1997, Egypt launched its
first Satellite N ILE S A T 101 and by 1999 there were 68 channels, Arab and foreign, using
it because o f its coverage in the region. Other satellites that serve the region include
EutelSat w2 and Hotbird 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. (Darouny, 2000)
During the course o f all this technological advancement, Arab governments
competed w ith private companies for a share in the distribution and content of
information and entertainment directed towards more than 300 m illion Arabic speakers
across the Arab M iddle East and other regions of the world. A race to occupy the living
rooms of Arabs around the world began. Initial satellite broadcasts by the Middle East
Broadcasting Center (M BC ) and the Egyptian government satellite channel (ESC) in
1991 were followed by a variety of contenders: In 1993, Arab Radio and Television
(ART) began broadcasting in Arabic and English. It was soon followed by Orbit Satellite
Television and Radio Network, which in 1994 transmitted on 19 television channels.
(Russell, 1994) Both these stations aired from Italy, while M B C aired from London. By
1996, Arab skies were raided by a surplus of satellite televisions. Several governmentsponsored services emerged, such as Libya TV, Yemen TV , Jordan T V , Oman T V and
the Syrian Satellite Channel, and they competed against private corporations such as
MBC, ART, Orbit, and also Lebanon’ s Future Television and the Lebanese Broadcasting

40

Corporation International, both o f whom were relatively late comers when they went on
the air respectively in 1994 and 1996. (Kraidy, 1998)

Lebanon’s position in the Arab W orld
Historically, Lebanon has always been an essential component of pan-Arab and
transnational media.

Baha Abu Laban reported that in the 1960s, President Nasser of

Egypt read the Lebanese press first thing in the morning to get a sense of current affairs
in the Arab world. (Kraidy, 2000) This is due to the fact that the Lebanese press has
traditionally reflected the political currents and power struggles occurring in the region as
well as on the local level. In reality, Lebanon’ s unique political and social history has
given this small country leverage and influence in the rest of the Arab world, particularly
in mass media. Lebanese journalists have always been pioneers in the field o f media and,
despite various repressions, have been able to maintain their status as political and social
analysts even if they had to immigrate to do so. Also, with all the technologies at hand
today, scholars view the digital age o f satellite broadcasting and the Internet as a way to
increase Lebanon's media's influence in the Arab world furthermore. (Kraidy, 2000)
The pan-Arab influence o f Lebanese television can also be explained by other
factors. Even though LB C , and since 1994 LBCI, was first created as a mouthpiece for
the Christian right-wing m ilitia group the “ Lebanese Forces,” the station remained
focused on its main goal, which was commercial initially. As a matter o f fact, throughout
the civil war, LBCI attracted a large section of the Muslim audience by broadcasting
Fawazeer Ramadan, an entertainment program produced only during the holy month o f
Ramadan, in addition to other special programming. This is seen as a grand gesture in a
community divided along sectarian lines with each sect having its own television and
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radio station. This commercial logic, imitated later on by other stations such as Future
television, has made these companies competitive, aiming for international production
standards despite limited specificities. Moreover, unlike other Arab broadcasters, these
companies did not have to please a certain ruling class to acquire a budget for their
productions, but had to attract and keep an audience in order to maintain a stable flow of
advertising dollars.

In other words, the relationship between the media and the

government was not as obvious as was the case w ith other Arabic channels.
In the 1990s, Lebanese television stations, and most prominently LBCI, produced
a variety o f socio-political talk shows which became w ildly popular with Lebanese
audiences. These shows tackled many issues usually considered taboo in the Arab world,
many o f which were social issues such as premarital sex, incest, and homosexuality.
Other episodes had distinctly political themes, such as representative democracy, civil
rights, gender equality, religion and atheism, freedom of speech and others. (Kraidy,
2002) Many of these shows were not broadcast via satellite at first, such as Ziad Njeim ’ s
“ Istifta” on M urr TV, and therefore they did not reach a vast pan-Arab audience.
However, some of them gradually reached the transnational level and reached Arab
homes over the globe, therefore affecting in one way or the other the usual status quo that
Arab leaders were used to. This novelty was seen as a first step towards an active role of
the Lebanese media in Arab countries including Lebanon, especially in the light o f the
fact that the trend in other Arab satellites’ programming was geared solely towards
entertainment, with the exception of Al-Jazeera television that was founded later in 1996.
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Transition between W ar and Satellite
During the period between 1960 and the early 1990s, broadcasting exploded out
of proportion w ithin the Lebanese borders. The years of c iv il war created a state of chaos
in the Lebanese skies so, in order to control the rising number o f T V stations and their
coverage, the Lebanese parliament passed a set of regulations in 1994 to re-structure
broadcasting. According to the new law, the only four authorities that could control a
media source were the Prime Minister and his/her cabinet.

In formulating media

regulations, Arab states are prim arily concerned with national security, often very loosely
defined as any criticism of the current regime. Moreover, laws regulating the media tend
to be ambiguous and flexible, giving the governments a lot o f power to interpret them
however they want to. In addition, law enforcement tends to be very selective, meaning
that if a media outlet has close connections to government officials and it breaches a
regulation, it is protected from being shut down.

Besides, there are still many

overlapping legal jurisdictions. For example, television stations have to abide not only to
the newly-created audiovisual law, but also to election laws, press laws and media laws.
The attempt to regulate television stations in Lebanon happened during Elias
Hrawi’ s presidency, which had the enormous job of re-establishing government authority
after the civil war.

The first Hrawi government felt the urgency o f introducing new

legislation that puts order into the broadcasting field, and therefore in 1991 the Minister
of Information recommended the reorganization of television broadcasting in Lebanon.
The first attempted reorganization granted local licenses only to stations whose total
assets are Lebanese and whose stations broadcasted exclusively on UHF channels.
However, in order not to upset the delicate status quo, the M inister recommended that
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Tele Liban be able to lease temporarily some o f its channels to other stations in return for
a fee. By that, the government insured the rights of Tele Liban and provided it w ith funds
to improve its facilities and services while at the same time allowing the de facto stations
to continue their operation, thus appeasing the different warring

factions. The

recommendations of the M inister were referred to a special ministerial committee, and
the committee's deliberations were the basis of a January 1992 Council o f Ministers
decision, which stated that "all television institutions which are presently operating de
facto and in contradiction to the existing laws as well as anybody who wishes to invest in
television must submit, w ithin a period of one month, an application fo r commercial
television broadcasting. (Kraidy, 1996)

The Council of Ministers also requested the

ministerial committee to determine the criteria and fees for granting licenses.
However, according to press reports, the ministers’ deliberations also dealt with
the likelihood of restricting television news to Tele Liban, which created a huge turmoil.
Press reports suggested that both the President and the Prime Minister called for an end to
the chaos and to the lack of restraint in the operation of media institutions, and follow ing
the meeting several members o f the Council of Ministers and numerous politicians issued
statements criticizing the deliberations. The ambassadors of England, France, the United
States and the Vatican also made statements supporting freedom of the press as a reaction,
and a newspaper reported that an ambassador of a prominent country declared that
suppressing news on television was a demand "forced on the government" from outside,
but that "freedom in Lebanon is a red line which may not be crossed without negatively
affecting the country." (Kraidy, 2000)
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A New Audiovisual Law
This resulted in a prompt response from the spokesman of the Prime Minister,
who denied that any decision was taken to restrict television news to Tele Liban, and the
ministerial committee quickly addressed itself to the task of drafting proposals for
legalizing the de facto stations and recommended that, until a new law governing
broadcasting in Lebanon is issued, the de facto stations be given annual leases, not
licenses, on the available UHF channels. Tw o years of indecision and delays passed until
the Council of Ministers finally approved a draft law regulating the chaotic use o f the
broadcasting channels in Lebanon, and the new law was adopted with minor
modifications by the Lebanese parliament in November 1994. Under the terms of this law
Tele Liban was to be fully owned by the government and its exclusive television
broadcasting right was to be revoked in return for granting it the right to broadcast on all
the V H F channels and one UHF channel. However, no compensation by the de facto
stations was granted to Tele Liban.
The new law required that establishing T V stations inside Lebanese territories or
its national waters be subject to prior licensing (Chapter 2, Article five) . It stipulated
that the duration of the license be sixteen years, renewable (Chapter 5, Article twentysix)4, and confirmed that licenses be granted by a government decree after consulting the
new council established by this law: "the National Council of Audio Visual Media.” This
council has, according to the audiovisual law, the power to recommend the suspension or
closure of stations, and is formed of ten members appointed jointly by the government

3Audiovisual Law o f 1994 translated by Marwan Kraidy, 1996
4 Ibid.
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and parliament (Chapter 5, Article seventeen).5 The only other entity that exercised this
kind of authority was to be the minister of information, follow ing a suggestion by the
cabinet. Moreover, the law classified television stations according to the following: the
first category being the television stations that transmit visual programs, including news
and political programs, covering all the Lebanese territory. The second Category contains
the television stations that transmit visual programs w ith the exception of news and
political programs, covering all the Lebanese territory. The third category falls under the
television stations that transmit coded signals and can only be received by subscribers
who possess the necessary technical equipment, while the fourth category contains the
international television stations that transmit via satellite and whose coverage goes
beyond the Lebanese territory. (Chapter 3, Article ten.)6
Granting broadcasting licenses requires, among other things, obtaining approved
technical transmission standards; meeting the necessary operational standards in terms of
its human and physical resources, and presenting evidence o f its ability to sustain
expenses for at least its first year of licensing. The law, furthermore, requires the station
to broadcast a volume of local production fixed by the "terms o f conditions” of
broadcasting in Lebanon (Chapter 2, Article seven)7.

What's more, the law limits

granting radio and television licenses to Lebanese citizens or companies, and the number
of licenses is also limited to one for individual companies or persons, meaning that one
entity cannot own shares in more than one medium. Most importantly, the audiovisual
law does not allow for a person or entity to own directly or indirectly more than ten

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
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percent of the total company shares. This includes the husband or wife and all direct
relatives, all considered one person or entity. (Chapter 4, Article thirteen)
The new audiovisual law was faced with a massive open debate. The weight of
the very vigorous audio-visual lobby was obvious in the press campaigns and statements
by politicians warning against "the dangers to freedom in Lebanon." (Kraidy, 2000)
Clearly, owners of the de facto stations and the political opposition were afraid o f the
way licenses w ill be granted, and they had reason to worry.

In September 1996, the

government granted licenses only to four television stations other than Tele Liban.
Ironically, the four television stations belonged to either members o f the government or
their relatives, maintaining the sensitive religious sectarian balance, a paramount element
of balance in Lebanese politics.
The stations that received licenses were the Lebanese Broadcasting Company
International (LBCI), representing the Maronite Christians and whose shareholders
included prominent members o f the government; Future Television, representing the
Rafik Hariri's economic vision for Lebanon and owned by the Prime M inister himself;
M urr Television (M TV ), representing the Greek Orthodox Christians and owned by the
brother of the then M inister o f Interior Michel Murr; and The National Broadcasting
Network (NBN), representing the Shiite Moslems and owned by the fam ily and
supporters of the Speaker o f the House o f Parliament, Nabih Berry. The governmental
decision was faced with a very vocal public opposition because it was based on political
and sectarian than on professional grounds, and the stations that were not licensed refused
to stop broadcasting, while the government used both threats and promises to implement
its decision: in some instances it used force to close some stations but in others it allowed
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some to appeal the decision. Only one additional television station, al-Manar, a branch of
the Islamic Hezbollah Party, which started broadcasting in June 1991 and spoke for the
resistance against the Israeli occupation o f South Lebanon, received a license in July
1996. However, a Christian religious station Tele Lumiere continues to broadcast till this
8

day without a license but with im plicit government backing.
Change came in 1998 when new elections change the government and put H ariri’ s
opponent Salim El Hoss in the prime ministry. The new government reconsidered the
applications rejected by the previous regime and consequently granted three more
licenses. Amusingly, the stations that received the new licenses were ones that opposed
the former Prime Minister: the New Television (N TV), in June 1999; The Independent
Communication Channel International (IC N I) and United Television (UTV), both in
September 1999. Nevertheless, these tw o channels did not broadcast further than during
their trial period.

Satellite Television in Lebanon
Following the 1994 audiovisual law, a race to reach the Arab and international
audience commenced.

Satellite reception dishes became among the fastest selling

commodities in Lebanon by that time, and L B C I started promising to include Canada in
its coverage plan. December 1998 statistics by Ipsos-Stat, a media research company,
stated that 58.2% of all Lebanese households had cable subscription to satellite stations
and Lebanese televisions needed to affirm its presence with those subscribers as well. In
fact, the local television stations felt that they are losing a major share of their audiences
to the cable system and decided to be part o f the new wave.

8 Ibid.
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Lebanese businessmen and television stations saw an excellent profit potential in
this new development. Two stations ventured into this field even before getting officially
licensed. These were L B C I and Future Television who established LBCSAT and Future
International SAT respectively. Both satellite stations were ranked among the leading
satellite programs in the Arab G ulf countries, an important source of advertising income.
Founded in February 1993, Future Television started a trial transmission in October 1994;
the testing period lasted two months on Arabsat 1A and was later launched on Arabsat
2A. Future International Television has 5-meter and 7-meter dishes installed in its Beirut
and Sidon sites. An additional 13-meter dish was later installed in the government earth
station in Jouret el Bailout as a redundant uplink facility.

It covers the Middle East,

North Africa, Southern Europe, North America and Australia.
L B C I plunged into this field in April 1996 when it established LBCSAT, a free
satellite channel. The channel has been broadcasting 22 hours a day since January 1997.
Later in 1997 LB C launched three new encrypted channels: LBC Europe, LBC America
and LBC Australia. Today, LBC Europe is broadcasting 16 hours a day while the two
other channels broadcast around the clock. A number o f recent audience studies indicate
that LBC SAT has a leading position alongside Al-Arabiyya in Saudi Arabia and the Arab
Gulf countries, especially as a negative reaction to Al-Jazeera. L B C I also empowered its
broadcast by allying itself with Al-Hayat newspaper and thus aiming to become a more
news-oriented television station alongside its entertainment side.
Faced w ith the success of both Lebanese satellite stations, the Lebanese
government decided that the best way to respond was to have its Tele Liban get into
satellite broadcasting.

An official government decision was adopted late in 1999 and
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Tele Liban began its satellite broadcast in the first week of March 2000. The T L service
covered the Arab world and part of Europe. However, it merely broadcasted its terrestrial
programming via satellite, not special programs to satisfy Arab viewers or the Lebanese
Diaspora, and was later shut down w ith the collapse of Tele Liban in 2002 because of
budget deficiencies.

A fourth station, al-Manar requested a license for satellite

transmission and approved the request in A pril 2000. The satellite service o f al-Manar
began a four-hour satellite on the eve o f May 24, 2000, the day of the liberation o f South
Lebanon. After the Palestinian "Intifada" broke out, on September 28, 2000, al-Manar
increased its satellite broadcasting to 18-hours a day. The success o f Lebanese satellite
stations encouraged two other stations to get into this field. M T V began its satellite
service in November 2000, on the eve o f its ninth anniversary, along with New TV.
Satellite broadcasting in Lebanon faced a number of obstacles at the beginning,
during the regime of President Hrawi and Prime Minister Hariri. The first obstacle was
to get government clearance to get a satellite connection, and the second and more
serious one was for the stations to secure the right to broadcast political news. A t the
beginning, the Hariri government did not permit stations to transmit news on their
satellite channels. The argument by the government was that Lebanese news programs
might negatively affect Lebanon's relations with some Arab countries inasmuch as these
countries may not tolerate the freedom the Lebanese media have.

Moreover, it was

decided that Lebanon’ s image is of utmost importance after the end o f the c iv il war, in
order to secure aid and investment from interested and wealthy countries such as the G ulf
countries. LBCI challenged the ban and continued airing its satellite news program. The
Hariri government reacted, late in December 1996, by deciding to censor all news as well

50

as direct and indirect political programs prepared for satellite broadcasting in general; and
a special "censorship team" was named including a number of well-respected journalists.
Again, LB C I challenged the decision and sought a ruling from the state's judiciary
advisory council. The council supported L B C I and consequently the Lebanese satellite
channels won another battle for the freedom o f information.
Today, only five channels remain in the satellite realm, and these are LB C I,
Future TV , New TV, NBN, and Al-Manar. The others were either shut down for political
or financial reasons.

Within the Lebanese territory, cable gives access to the four

channels without the need for subscription, while you pay to get them in the Arab world,
North America, Europe, and Australia. W hile Al-M anar is mainly political, even in its
entertainment programming, the other three are more commercially oriented, w hile not
receiving a lot of advertising revenues. T ill this day, the race to reach satellite access
remains political, regardless of the fact that they might not generate profit, and they rarely
do. Moreover, the news section of these channels remain directly tied to their terrestrial
counterparts, which makes them oriented more towards local issues and regional issues
that relate to the local level. This has created problems for these satellite televisions
because it has made them vulnerable to the government’ s w ill, and more so because they
project an image of Lebanon that government officials would rather hide. These tensions
and others created a relationship between the government and satellite televisions that can
be best portrayed as controlling, as we w ill see in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3: Recent Developments
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The decade that followed the civil war brought change and hope fo r the Lebanese
media industry and for the Lebanese people in general. The creation o f a law regulating
the audiovisual realm brought some legality to the chaotic situation that preceded it, and
many thought that regulating television w ill give more legitimacy to those stations that
were already present, and a diversity of opinions that would pave the way towards a fu lly
democratic state. However, the post-war era brought a different reality than what media
and people were anticipating.

A fter the relatively “ free” and unrestricted years o f the

civil war, where m u ltip licity o f opinion came as a natural consequence o f the situation,
the political landscape in Lebanon came to be ruled by one dominant political discourse,
and Syria became an increasingly major player in Lebanese daily, regional, and
international affairs, along w ith other powerful regional players.

Moreover, the fu ll

blown freedom of promoting every station’ s own political discourse came to a halt with
the Lebanese government trying to take control of what was left o f the country, and the
audiovisual law of 1994 and the more indirect restrictions imposed on mass media
became recurrent and more frequent as the country rose further away from the chaos of
civil war. Media was once again seen as a tool for nation-building instead o f tool for
promoting democracy, and was considered a dangerous element i f it was given full
freedom of expression.
The Syrian influence was the main factor, and still is, in trying to regulate what
information survives censorship and what doesn’t, and striving to keep control and
remain in power was the main drive behind the constant oppression o f freedom o f speech
throughout the nineties and until this day.

Syria’ s interference in daily politics, in

addition to its m ilitary presence on Lebanese soil, dictated much of how the Lebanese
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government interacted with the Lebanese media. For example, the cabinet of Prime
M inister Salim Hoss, fearful of partial election coverage by private stations, evoked a
storm of protest in early 2000 by introducing a b ill that forbade all such stations from
reporting on parliamentary election campaigns, which are often seen as rigged and
designed especially to favor the traditional government supportive of the Syrian influence.
This attempt at blanket censorship provided yet another reminder that the scope for
political commentary by both terrestrial and satellite broadcasters based in Lebanon
remains subject to local regulation. Thus the survival instinct of the Lebanese regime
continues to preempt any liberalizing impact o f satellite television especially that these
fall under its territorial jurisdiction.

Opposition vs. Government
The official ending of Tele-Liban's monopoly under Lebanon's 1994 Audiovisual
Media Law occurred at a time when the spread of Arab satellite channels was in fu ll
swing. Indeed, it gave the country's private broadcasters, led by LBC I and Future TV , a
timely opportunity to enter the satellite race, keeping in mind that its primary purpose
was to regulate the chaotic explosion o f small broadcasting stations that had mushroomed
during the Lebanese civil war. When, m ainly for political rather than technical reasons,
only six Lebanese television stations were awarded licenses under the law, those deprived
of access to the airwaves denounced this as an act o f suppression. (Kraidy, 2002) It was
a not a shock, for example, that R afik H ariri, Lebanon's prime minister at the time,
became a beneficiary of the licensing system through his shareholding in Future TV, even
i f his name was not originally present among the shareholders. The fact that “ opposition”
televisions were granted licenses constituted more of a shock to the general population
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than anything else: LBCI, a Maronite and dissenting television, M T V , with Christian
Orthodox affiliation that is opposed to Christian Orthodox government officials, and
NTV, owned by Tahseen Khayyat, a businessman strongly opposed to Prime Minister
Hariri.

However, the developments that occurred later on proved that opposition was

only permitted to the extent that it does not cross the accepted boundaries, and
opposition’ s role in promoting freedom of speech was continuously controlled and
threatened by government interference, generated by regional pressures.
There are still, however, distinct attempts to regain the freedom previously
enjoyed by the media. These are constant, coming from opposition forces and certain
more vocal journalists. For example, the Lebanese parliamentary elections in September
2000 showed one more time an unpredictable and independent trend that some Lebanese
journalists still have despite the pressures.

For the longest time, Syrian-Lebanese

relations were considered a taboo issue, one of two red lines for the Lebanese press, the
other one being current President Emile Lahoud. Other red lines are still present, even
though not as strong in their effect on incurring censorship. These are Hezbollah’ s
legitimacy as a resistance backed by Iran and Syria, the Palestinian cause, and Saudi
Arabia and its ruling family.

However, during the 2000 parliamentary elections, An-

Nahar's publisher and Editor-in-chief Jibran Tueni wrote a strong editorial calling for a
reassessment o f bilateral relations between Lebanon and Syria and advocating a more
equal partnership, (Kraidy, 2000) a demand that was discussed only in private circles, and
was considered a typically Christian demand.

The effect this editorial had on the

Lebanese political and journalistic realm was so strong to the extent that during the
electoral campaign o f the months of August and September, even Lebanese politicians of
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all political groups began calling fo r revision of Lebanese-Syrian relations, w ith the
Lebanese media covering these developments very closely. Tensions began to increase
furthermore in September 2000, when the Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir
made cutting comments and asked Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon during an
interview with the BBC. (K raidy, 2000) Relayed on BBC radio and heard throughout the
Arab world, the patriarch's comments induced a forceful response fro m the Syrian
information minister, who criticized those opposed to Syria's presence in Lebanon.

It

also reached countless o f exiled Lebanese and interest groups that supported this idea and
saw this as a sign to go forw ard in their demand.
In addition to the B B C and other foreign sources, Lebanese stations such as LB C I
covered the story closely, leading to a power struggle within the station to control news
about bilateral relations between Lebanon and Syria. However, such stories often turn
into a sectarian mess once the local stations come into play and are often seen as holding
sectarian views: for example, in the case o f LB C I, criticism was voiced against the station
for holding “ anti-Lebanese” views, a criticism often directed towards the Christian
denomination, and in particular the Maronites, leading the channel to step back and
carefully study its selection o f news and their content. Moreover, the Syrian occupation
began to be measured w ith Lebanese nationalism, with Chief o f Parliam ent Nabih Berry
proclaiming that the Syrian troops w ill only get out of Lebanon “ over m y dead body,”
and Hezbollah’ s leader Hassan Nasrallah gathering up his Shiite supporters to proclaim
that the real majority does not want Syria out of Lebanon just yet, and so the trend
created by Tueni soon calmed down, though it never totally disappeared.
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This example demonstrates the pow er o f transnational media to expose political
discourse by taking it public on the airwaves. However, there still exist an assortment o f
legal and less legal control mechanisms on Arab media and the Lebanese television in
particular, however independent it may seem to be.

Government interaction w ith the

media still dictates the content and language o f media, because o f the close economic and
political relationship these two have.

H ariri's influence on media and politics, fo r

example, polarizes the Lebanese political, business, and media circles, as most people
have either celebrated or unmistakably expressed rejection to his reappointment as prim e
minister in 2000.

His dual status as both player, as a media mogul, and arbitrator, as

prime minister, is a very striking example o f how media and politics interact. As V ice
President o f the National Media C ouncil Marwan Shalak described it, (personal
communication, August 2003) whenever a politician owns or proxy owns shares o f a
certain television stations, one can be sure that the latter w ill be influenced by the form er
in various forms and ways. N B N ’ s CEO Nasser Safieddine describes it in a different way:
“ It is only natural that not to take positions to make these people unhappy, after all they
finance the company.” (Personal communication, August 2003)

Even though this

statement is true to any company in general, the effect that this statement has on
Lebanese media is drastic: because the elites monopolize the economic and politica l
power in Lebanon, the content of media becomes a mere projection of what this power
wants to broadcast.

In this context, the m u ltip lic ity o f media outlets becomes a mere

playground fo r political elites and loses its role as a Public Sphere.
Moreover, not only being in a pro-government television defines the content o f
this television among certain predetermined lines. As the case o f N TV shows, being in
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the lines o f opposition against a certain political figure also determines news selection:
since N T V ’ s owner Tahseen Khayyat is known to be against R afik H ariri in particular,
much o f N T V ’ s news content is focused to the economic situation, and how H a riri’ s
yearly budgets and policies are only worsening the situation.

As a matter o f fact, the

w ord on the Lebanese street is that N T V is the “ economy station,” w hile L B C I is more
often than not seen as the “ Maronite station” or the “ Entertainment station,” depending
on the p o litic a l situation. Among the government side, Future T V is often referred to as
“ H arin station,” w hile N B N (National Broadcasting N ew s) is iro n ica lly termed “ Nabih
B erry N e tw o rk,” referring to the chief o f parliament whose fa m ily and entourage
com bined own more than 40% o f the shares.

This on ly goes to show how much

c re d ib ility these stations have lost over the years o f their existence. The audience already
knows w hat to expect when watching a particular television, and thus the whole idea of
the media generating thoughtful discussion becomes obsolete.

Though the journalists

themselves need not be allied directly to the owner’ s or shareholders’ ideology, they do
not have com plete control over the content of their w o rk because they themselves have
self-censorship mechanisms that they use to protect themselves.

Preserving Lebanon’s Image
In addition, w ith the recent violence between Palestinians and Israelis, the war on
Iraq, the pressures on Syria, and Lebanon's loom ing economic recession, the Lebanese
government is most probably expected to play a delicate balancing act, keeping a vigilant
eye on satellite broadcasters in particular in an attempt to control Lebanon's image in the
Arab w orld. This is a role that is not only demanded by Lebanese officials but also by
different regional players.

Firstly, Syria is more and more w ary o f the Lebanese
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discourse on whether Syrian m ilitary forces should withdraw fro m the Lebanese
territories. It intends to keep its presence in Lebanon as an ultimate resource in its peace
negotiations w ith Israel, and thus does not want this discourse gaining any more
importance than it

already

has, especially

with the introduction

o f the

Syria

Accountability A ct that includes withdrawal from Lebanon as a necessary step towards
bettering relations w ith the U nited States. Secondly, Saudi Arabia is w ary o f discussing
any of its national matters on satellite television, especially with the grow ing effect the
Jihadists and reformists are having on Saudi Arabia’ s internal discourse, and the fear of
any attempt on toppling the Saud ruling fam ily.
Therefore, the p o litica l forces that have shaped the emerging satellite industry
remain problematic fo r that industry’ s growth, not only in the Lebanese arena but in the
whole Arab world. A nd, even though satellite television did undermine state control of
television flows by transm itting programs from other Arab countries that are more open
in certain social trends and traditions, it did not achieve the same effect on the political
level, maybe w ith the exception o f Al-Jazeera, which is more news-oriented and
relatively less constrained in its political coverage. N B N ’ s Safieddine explains the need
for state control by saying that there is no need to display “ our internal cuisine” to
potential tourists and investors, and discuss the electricity company’ s scandal or the
polluted beaches in fro n t o f viewers from around the world, and sees censorship in that
sense as a great tool to encourage tourism in Lebanon, which is one o f the main resources
the country actually has.

He sees that criticizing Saudi Arabia, fo r example, w ill only

result in less tourist in flu x and less investments. He also sees the Syrian predicament as a
necessary reality that w ill not end until the war with Israel o ffic ia lly ends.
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This is a

position defended by many officials in the government as well as Lebanese businessmen
and others.
Idealists see developments such as the case o f Al-Jazeera as the precursor o f a
pan-Arab civil society unshackled from government censorship. They view satellite
television in the Arab world as a threat to the regimes themselves, along with the advent
of the Internet. In this logic, satellite television talk-shows, as well as news, all serve as a
catalyst for a democratic renewal, where Arab audience members would mobilize as
citizens and become increasingly interested in participation in democratic politics.
(Kraidy, 2000) The reality of the situation, however, is that most governments in the
region that have allowed a level o f freedom in satellite televisions still exercise
considerable power, even if im plicitly. A nd Lebanon is no exception, even though it
relatively enjoys more freedom than others.

Indirect Control of an Uncontrollable Medium
Indirect control of privately owned media companies takes different shapes. In
Lebanon, most members of the board o f LB C are associated with the Syrian regime, and
thus the station is always limited by p o litica lly sensitive issues that it cannot address.
According to documents provided by the National Council for Media, (Shalak, Marwan,
personal communication, August 2003) Suleiman Franjieh and Issam Fares own each ten
percent o f L B C I’ s shares. Both parliamentary deputies and ministers, their link to Syria
is obvious through the extent of their power in politics. Moreover, the division o f the
shares among fam ily members further makes the channel more politically oriented
towards one main pattern: Sheikh Pierre Daher owns nine percent of the shares o f L B C I,
while his brother Sheikh Marcel Daher owns ten percent, and his wife owns one percent.
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And, even though L B C I’ s shares are separate fro m terrestrial L B C , the fact that most
newscasts and p o litica l program are the same give terrestrial ownership and a ffilia tio n a
great deal o f leverage when choosing news content.

A s a m atter o f fact, only L B C I is

changing this dependence pattern among Lebanese television: it has created a bureau for
satellite news, and has affiliated itse lf w ith A1 Hayat. H ow ever, it continues to broadcast
its local news broadcast fo r the purpose o f reaching interested Lebanese immigrants
abroad, and thus s till mixes terrestrial issues w ith the broader satellite issues.
Such an ownership pattern is also seen in the other television stations, such as
Future T e levision: H a riri’ s w ife owns 10% o f the shares, w h ile his sister Bahiya H ariri -a
deputy at the parliam ent- owns another 10%. G haleb A b d e l L a tif Shamaa, one o f the
most p rom ine nt counselors and businessman closely related to R a fik H a n ri, owns 9.9%,
w hile R a fik H a riri’ s children, Saadeddme and Bahaeddine, each ow n 8%. To top it all,
even his b ro th e r-in -la w owns 7.3% o f the shares, w h ich totals 51.3% o f the television
owned b y the H a riri fa m ily alone. (Shalak, M arw an, personal com m unication, August
2003) A rtic le IV , clause 13 o f the audiovisual la w o f 1994 clearly lim its the acquiring o f
shares in any media institutions, though the Lebanese p o litic a l system has found other
ways to co n tro l w hat the station broadcasts.9 The law specifies that one person cannot
acquire m ore than 10% o f the total shares, but it does no t address the fact that people
from the same p o litic a l or business a ffilia tio n o r fro m one extended fa m ily often find
ways to co n tro l bigger shares o f each station.
W h ile several countries, such as Bahrain, Jordan, and Qatar, have been discussing
the e lim in a tio n o f th e ir Inform ation M inistries, Lebanon’ s M in is te r o f Inform ation is

9 The O ffic ia l Document o f the Terrestrial Audiovisual Law #382
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being rendered irrelevant by the intervention of state security agencies in the daily
operations of the media, under the excuse of enforcing laws and regulations. Moreover,
the Minister of Inform ation is given the power to decide whether a certain station is
abiding to the rules according to the 1994 audiovisual law, though most o f the time
decisions to shut down or punish a station are done through other means. This is in spite
of assurances by the current Lebanese administration that it w ou ld protect media
freedoms, and despite the clear wording of the press and audiovisual laws that state that
freedom of the press should be respected fully, while taking into consideration laws and
regulations.10 The closure o f M u rr Television by security forces on September 4, 2002,
revealed some of these troublesome trends: the Minister of Inform ation, Ghazi A rid i, was
not informed of the decision, and objected to it in strong terms. M oreover, the National
Media Council was not consulted w ith and also received the news w ith utmost surprise
and shock. Also, since the A udio-Visual Law would not condone the station’ s closure,
authorities resorted to the Law o f Publications and the Elections La w to ju s tify the
crackdown. A court ruled that M T V harmed relations with Syria, undermined the dignity
of the Lebanese president and broadcast illegal electoral propaganda. (K ra id y, 2002)
Creative interpretation and enforcement of the law is thus an instrument of
political control even in the Arab w orld’ s supposedly most liberal countries.

The

suspension provoked an outcry over fears for public freedoms and rifts w ithin the
government, with four ministers boycotting the weekly cabinet session w hich newspapers
criticized for failing to address the issue.11 Thus, multiple layers o f censorship persist. In

10 Ibid.
11 Agence France Press
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addition to the control that Syria exercises over Lebanese affairs, and the limitations on
free speech carried over from the Penal Code and Press Law to the Audiovisual M edia
Law, individual stations impose unwritten restrictions of their own, because o f an array
o f pressures that they predict or encounter.

The idea that a satellite television station

would create a venue that goes beyond regular government attempts of control and w ould
foster the creation of a critical and analytical audience seems like a theory that has yet to
be implemented in the real dealings that occur between government and media. In the
Lebanese example, media seems to be caught in the middle of forces that go beyond c iv il
society and are more elitist in their structure and format.
W hat’ s more, even the Saudi and G u lf Sheikhs who usually have shares in
stations such as MBC and ART -w hich are Saudi stations by excellence-, have business
and personal links to Lebanon's L B C I and Future TV . The satellite television law that
was introduced in 1996 gave more leeway to the lim its o f ownership previously set up fo r
terrestrial stations. In fact, law number 531 that appeared in the official magazine number
33 on 29/7/96 licensed satellite companies follo w in g the recommendations put by the
telecommunication minister, and does not totally abide by the rule of terrestrial
broadcasting. In fact, although it still abides to clause 4 o f the audiovisual law o f 1994,
which states that the information minister has power over the content and broadcast o f
these stations, it does not follow the 10% lim it in ownership and does not specify
Lebanese nationality as a criterion to own shares in a satellite company. (Francis, Tony,
personal communication, February 15, 2004) For example, Sheikh Walid Bin Talal from
Saudi Arabia owns shares in terrestrial LB C , and was even naturalized through his
mother to achieve the conditions o f ownership, something that is usually inconceivable
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since women cannot give their Lebanese citizenship to their offspring. (Personal
communication, August, 2003) Moreover, Sheikh W alid Bin Talal recently purchased a
49 percent stake in the satellite broadcasting arm o f the Lebanese Broadcasting
Corporation (LBC ) for $98 million, a transaction made possible from the fact that the
one-page law that regulates satellite televisions does not lim it ownership to a certain
percentage.12 In addition, N TV announced in the beginning o f 2004 that it w ill be selling
its satellite shares to Qatari princes not yet named, in order to expand and diversify its
scope to reach a more regionally-oriented level of news. This step, in addition to Bin
Talal’ s latest purchase and L B C I’ s merger with Al-Hayat at the end o f 2003, signify a
new era for these satellite televisions, whereby limitations w ill go beyond the local to the
regional, w hile at the same time strengthening their ratings and news content in face of
rising competition. In fact, government interference on the Lebanese level would pale in
comparison to the more complex control mechanisms used by monarchies such as Saudi
Arabia, and image concerns would become more astute due to the fact that businessmen
not only have media outlets, but also investments they want to protect and promote.
Clearly, politicians in the region consider the printed and seen word extremely
powerful, or they would not be so determined to silence their critics or try to buy them
out. Given widespread illiteracy in many Arab countries and the undisputed potency of
the television image, the stakes in television censorship are even higher. Where Penal
Codes, codes o f ethics or straightforward government censorship fail to achieve the
desired effect, the authorities have shown that television journalists are liable to receive
the same treatment given to newspaper journalists throughout history.
12 A1 Iktissad Wal Aamal Group
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Therefore,

journalists are driven more and more to watch what they publish or broadcast under the
threat of detention and imprisonment for a variety of reasons. W ith such an armory of
methods still in use fo r inducing self-censorship, satellite channels w ill not be the
instrument that erodes censorship in terrestrial television especially that it is linked the
latter by headquarters, journalists, and news content.

As a matter o f fact, for this to

happen, a change in political systems themselves is required. As members of UNESCO,
Arab governments are party to the Sanaa Declaration, adopted by the 29th session of the
UNESCO General Conference in Paris in 1997. This enjoins them to end censorship and
the intimidation o f media professionals and to grant statutes of editorial independence to
their state broadcasters and news agencies. (Sakr, 2002) This has yet to be implemented,
as is the case o f many other laws that have been stipulated or ratified along the years.
In the Lebanese experience, the government is not as forceful in exercising
control over freedom o f inform ation, but it is getting less and less im p lic it lately, despite
the technological revolution o f information.

Still, Lebanese satellite televisions have

learned their lessons fro m the terrestrial experience, and operate accordingly.

This

convenient setup has allowed television stations a certain degree of freedom while at the
same time lim itin g them on the kind of reports they broadcast. Thus, although LB C I is a
mouthpiece for the M aronite in Lebanon, the fact that some shares are owned by some
pro-Syrians makes it more lim ited by some sensitive issues it cannot address. In an
answer to my question on the degree of freedom NBN television has, NBN director
Nasser Safieddine said, “ It is only a show of respect to our shareholders not to broadcast
news that would be harm ful to them.” (Personal communication, August 2003) In his
point of view, this is not a lim itation of freedom but a consensus already accepted.
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However, this "show of respect" is practiced in a wide array of examples, and not only
when it affects a certain shareholder. New T V , owned by a competitor to PM R afik H ariri
Tahseen Khayyat, had to withhold from showing a talk show that criticizes Saudi Arabia
because o f pressures from H ariri him self to close down the station. NTV news director
M iriam El-Bassam insists the reason for the channel’ s compliance with what the
government “ advised” them to do was a pure strategic one: to her and other journalists, it
was a matter of prioritizing and deciding how to tackle certain issues. (Personal
communication, August, 2003) Under the threat o f being shut down, this is the strategy
most channels pursue; they tone down their controversial stances in order to gain more
ground in other more important issues to them. In fact, N T V ’ s news director considered
local issues more important than broadcasting a talk show about opposition in Saudi
Arabia, and thus preferred to opt fo r compliance rather than confrontation, and keep the
medium open for more local issues than regional ones. The case of NTV also showed the
degree of interference the government has on satellite television: because o f internal
tensions between the prime m inister and the president, the fate o f N TV proved to be less
tragic: though N TV was shut down on the orders o f the prime minister, the president
ordered it should be opened again as a political show o f strength, and N TV was spared
the fate of M urr TV.
M urr T V did not have the same luck even though the prime minister in this case
tried his best to re-open it: in an o ffic ia l court order, M urr TV was shut down by
hundreds o f internal security forces, and was denied several appeals to re-open it
throughout 2001 and 2002. The reason fo r the shutdown was different than that o f N T V :
it was not based on censorship or preserving relations w ith a friendly country, but
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supposedly on local elections. This time the government used a far more powerful tool to
silence an opposition voice that was becoming more vocal, which is the power of the
ju d icia ry branch, bypassing the National Media C ouncil and other M edia committees, as
always. The reasons for the shutdown were clear: the owner o f M u rr T V had just won a
very controversial seat in the parliament, and furtherm ore had a television station and a
radio to voice his opposition. However, the o ffic ia l reasons were that Gabriel M urr used
his media to campaign for himself, something that is forbidden under the elections law.
This was being practiced by every station at that tim e, but was still used as a pretext to
silence the opposition.
A lso , in this case, it became apparent that the reasons fo r shutdown were not only
political, but also due to external pressures, because the television station was strongly
opposing the Syrian army’ s presence in Lebanon fo r more than 20 years.

Many

opposition figures criticized this move as a pure show o f force on the part o f the Syrian
government, and a clear submission from the part o f the Lebanese government. In this
instance, the government used the most indirect means to censor media, through
bypassing the m inistry o f information, and the audiovisual law, and justifying the
crackdown by resorting to the elections law. Consultant M arwan Shalak o f the National
Media C ou ncil condemned this as a purely po litica l move, and criticized the government
for not resorting to the body who is supposed to decide upon these cases, which is the
national media council itself, put in place iro n ic a lly by the same government that is
bypassing it. (Personal communication, August, 2003) This is a perfect example o f the
extent to w hich the Lebanese and consequently the Syrian government allow freedom of
speech and the voicing of differing opinions on national and cross-boundaries television.

67

This trend is not particular to M urr T V ; in fact, multiple layers o f censorship exist,
and are justified not on ly by the audiovisual law, but also by the penal code, the election
law, and the publications law, to which the audiovisual law refers to extensively. In
addition, individual stations impose restrictions on themselves to avoid confrontation
with the government, w hich creates a web of limitations on the freedom o f expression,
which the audiovisual law defends, so vehemently in its first clause.

The examples

mentioned above are ju st a part o f the current attempts that the government made to lim it
the power of television, and especially the satellite ones that have a w ider coverage. The
government has always realized the importance of mass media, and recognized the
responsibilities and burden that satellite television added to the equation, because of
external as well as internal considerations. Moreover, the Syrian role in this example also
makes itself clear, as w e ll as its interference in elections and their outcomes.
Ever since the firs t publication law and up until the audiovisual law o f 1994, the
first and foremost concern fo r the Lebanese government has been to take care o f not
upsetting its neighbors. In article seven, clause 2 of the audiovisual la w 13, it is stated that
it is not permitted to air news that affect national security and national interests, but the
law is vague on what exactly constitutes these interests, and lately the interest o f the
Lebanese government has been to please Syria as well as any potential Arab investor.
Throughout the past decade, the government has shut down institutions temporarily on
the ground that they are destabilizing national security, which can range fro m airing news
on an internal religious issue or criticizing the Syrian government.

In fact, at the

beginning satellite televisions were not permitted to air political news whatsoever. When
13 The Official Document o f the Terrestrial Audiovisual Law #382
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L B C I challenged the ban and aired political programs, a “ special censorship” team was
put in place to enforce the ban. L B C I managed to challenge the government’ s decision
by going to court, and won the battle. However, as it proved later on, this was not the
only obstacle satellite televisions had to face, and the battle still goes on to this day. W ith
Syria being the main power broker in Lebanon, it does not matter how many media
outlets the Lebanese people have, because they all fall under one tent, which is a proSyrian government and consequently a lo t o f red lines that media is not supposed to cross.

Media as a Projection of Lebanese Affairs
The Lebanese media situation is an example of the contradictory state o f
transformation and stagnation that Lebanon is going through since the end o f the c iv il
war.

The existing media laws specify that television institutions may not be directly

managed or run by the government or private individuals or politicians. The practice,
however, is different but congruent w ith the special socio-political structure o f the
Lebanese society. An examination o f the development o f television in Lebanon suggests
that the measures taken by government to regulate television broadcasting since its
inception in Lebanon were not intended to encourage television officials to deal w ith
themes of significant concern to the average individual, mainly those emerging fro m the
c iv il war. Themes that deal w ith the need for the cooperation of the different sectarian
groups in the reconstruction o f the country and in bringing about the unity o f its people
are almost absent in Lebanese television. In fact, the different government legislations
that were introduced aimed neither at prom oting original productions, nor at providing
more

opportunity

for local

organizational structures.

talent

and developing

responsible and professional

Moreover, themes that deal with election reform, Syrian
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m ilita ry presence, or the religious political system are often penalized or censored for the
sake o f “ national security.” As a matter o f fact, state legislation in the area of television
broadcasting is aimed at allowing government officials and the ruling political bosses to
exploit this medium for their own political goals.
The assessment of the growth of television in Lebanon shows that government
officia ls and political bosses endeavored to legalize the ir monopoly over television news
and what m ight threaten their political ambitions or the status quo.

Additionally, its

control over programs shows that the friction between television authorities with the
government during the past four decades was due to the interest o f the television officials
in financial and political gain more than their interest in securing increased freedom to
produce programs that address themes relevant to the social and economic problems that
are confronting the country. No serious investigation has been carried out by the media
about claims o f corruption in the government, w hich was often voiced by senior
government officials, despite the fact that there exist a number o f opposition televisions
that w ou ld be interested in this theme. Instead, opposition televisions such as N T V and
L B C I have lim ited themselves to criticize on person in the government, thus weakening
their c re d ib ility among viewers and distracting them from the bigger issues.
A dditio nally, no serious program, to date, has been produced to deal with the
sectarian con flict that plagues the country. In fact, even though one o f N B N ’ s critically
acclaimed programs goes under the name of “ Lebanon’ s Sects,” the program limits itself
to introducing those sects to the viewers, a good inform ative step still not tackling the
issues at stake. In addition, when a worker at the Education M inistry killed eight of his
co-workers in a mad rage in the summer o f 2002, L B C I’ s coverage of the tragedy
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consisted of criticizing the fact that six of these eight workers were Christian, w hile the
killer was M uslim , and im plie d that this was a sectarian crime. N T V , on the other hand,
implied that the reason fo r this heinous crime was H ariri’ s bad economic policies which
drove the poor man to madness, which is typically what the audience expects these two
stations to do. This, among other examples, shows to what extent the N ew as w ell as Old
Public Spheres are engaging c iv il society into constructive and critical discussions. The
fact is, in the current media structure, there is no room for freedom o f expression of
opinion. It is only through a reform o f the media itself that c iv il society can start using
this outlet to reach a vaster audience and attain the desired effect this new technology
supposedly produces.

Restructuring the Media
The main problem facing broadcasting in Lebanon is a double-edged sword. It is
primarily one o f both the government and media institutions lacking the adequate
structures that w ould provide the opportunity for this medium to contribute to its society's
unity and cohesion as w e ll as to address issues that are relevant to the every day life of
the average citizen. Instead, this medium gives prevailing interest to commercialism at
the expense o f professionalism and social responsibility. It is also focused on criticizing
one factor affecting Lebanese affairs at the expense of giving the w hole journalistically
objective picture. As a matter o f fact, news programs focus m ainly on news o f politicians,
with little reflective coverage o f issues that concern the general public.

For example,

when Marcel Ghanem’ s “ Kalam E l Nass” (People Talk) invited Finance m inister Fouad
Sanioura to a surprise meeting w ith a fam ily way below the line o f poverty (Kalam el
Nass, 2004), the questions were more lim ited to pinning down the m inister in general
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instead o f asking him to defend and explain his budget plan that does not help the poor in
any material way.
Examining the content o f television programs one gets the impression that
television officials believe that their viewers w ill accept whatever is given to them and,
therefore, do not feel the necessity to make more effort to provide them with content that
addresses their needs for inform ation about issues that concern their livelihood and that
are relevant to their daily concerns. This has lead television stations to air low quality
entertainment programs and talk shows that may entertain the average audience but does
not appeal to their mind or meet their intellectual and developmental needs.
It is true that the Lebanese government has hampered the growth of television and
kept broadcasting in a state o f stagnation. It is also true that Lebanese television today,
especially the type depicted on the satellite channels, is a melange of various inconsistent
programs, policies and structures, predom inantly foreign in orientation and barely
relevant to the needs of Lebanese society or Arab world. I f one examines the content o f
these satellite channels one finds the follo w in g: Television soap operas that come from
Egypt, Syria, and Latin America;

ta lk shows w hich usually host a discussant and a

political or economic personality, w ith a discussant frequently biased towards one
opinion

and consequently attacking

or com plim enting the guest on their acts;

entertainment programs in the form o f contests and games that saturate satellite channels
heavily; as well as imported movies and series from different regions.

Nevertheless,

there were and still are to some extent some satirical programs that make fun o f the
current political or social situation, but these too were deemed too daring by the Lebanese
government: as a matter of fact, as o f January 2004, the government issued an order to
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stop airing “ Basmat Watan,” (A Nation’ s Smiles, or When a Nation Died, depending on
how the sentence is worded) under the pretext of, once again, harming relations with a
neighboring country.14 Still, there is a growing awareness among journalists and
producers o f the importance of the medium in tackling important issues. For example,
poverty was one o f the most recurring themes that fille d LBC Fs programming during the
Christmas holidays of 2003. However, the programming consisted of giving out aid to
needy families and looked more like a “ makeover” program than a serious one that
discusses the roots and solutions to this alarming and growing phenomenon.
P rior to the advent of satellite broadcasting in Lebanon and other third world
countries television broadcasting constituted a lim ited local problem: it was restricted to
few channels for a moderate capacity audience. It is true that national audiences then had
to watch programs that were controlled by censors "to protect the interests of the
country." Today, however, with satellite broadcasting, the national audiences are at the
mercy o f tens of satellite stations whose broadcasters continuously bombard them with
low culture and a variety of low quality programs. Lebanese television broadcasting is in
urgent need for reorganization in order to cope w ith the role it is expected to play in the
reconstruction of a country that has suffered from a long and costly civil war. While the
government is in need to provide the climate o f freedom that is conducive for the
broadcasting medium, the broadcasters need to be committed to their social responsibility
and to developing a well-trained corps of professionals in the different fields of television
production.(Dajani, 2001).

Moreover, television and government officials need to be

separate from each other in terms of interest and affiliation, in order to give the television
the objectivity and professionalism it needs to thrive in a competitive world.
14F rom A s s a fir Newspaper, December 2003
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Today,

there are numerous attempts to modernize the traditional means o f communication that
Lebanon has been plagued w ith ever since its founding, and one o f them is the recent
merger between L B C I and Al-Hayat, which resulted in an expansion o f bureaus and
access for LBCI, and thus raised its professional commitment to report the news without
restrictions.

However, w ith

an increasing tendency o f government interference,

television w ill always be lim ited in news reporting, especially when this interference is
growing in intensity and directness: on December 6, 2003, the owner o f New T V was
arrested for allegedly harboring illegal links with Israel, and was released a day later
though he remains under investigation according to court sources15. Tahseen Khayyat
was arrested in his office by m ilita ry police on charges of harboring illegal links with
Israel and damaging Beirut's Relations with neighboring countries, and was accused of
meeting with Israeli o fficia ls in Qatar. The fact that he was released the follo w in g day
shows that the whole move was political. In fact, his arrest was denounced by former PM
Hoss and the media, lin k in g it to his NTV's hard-hitting coverage o f a money-laundering
probe at Lebanon's A l-M ad ina bank, saying it was intended to intim idate N T V into
silence and stop its investigations.

This latest attack on freedom was a hard-hitting

reality to many o f those who were hoping for an increased freedom o f voicing opinions
and digging through issues that affect public opinion and people’ s livelihood, but was
still a living proof that the government is not ready to let down its guard concerning
satellite freedoms.
A1 Manar Television m ight be the only exception to the fate that awaits
opposition televisions in Lebanon: a propaganda tool for the Hezbollah resistance, Manar

15 Agence France Presse
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T V has been vocal of its opposition to participate in the Lebanese government,
considering it a corrupted institution that does not represent the people.

N ot one

Hezbollah deputy has ever been minister in any o f the Lebanese cabinets follo w in g the
T a if agreement, and the party is very adamant until today in its decision not to participate
in anything other than representative elections. In addition to its controversial position as
the only war m ilitia that still has the right to hold guns, and due to the fact that Syria and
Iran are main regional brokers that support Hezbollah, A1 Manar TV has managed to
maintain a relative liberty in showing programs that might be frowned upon i f they were
broadcast somewhere else, like controversial Syrian production that criticize Israel and
the United States. A1 Manar T V also airs programs that show Hollywood movies, w hile
criticizing them by showing their stereotypes towards the Arab community. W hile this
might be seen differently if it were shown on other channels, A1 Manar T V defends itse lf
w ith the support of regional powers, in addition to its powerful role as a national
resistance and supporter of the Palestinian cause.

Al-Manar's website describes its

mission as follows: "Lebanese T V channels have been overwhelmed by a trend o f movies
and programs that can only be described as immoral. A t the time when the Lebanese such as any people coming out o f a devastating war- needed what could erase the effects
o f that conflict and work on building the personality o f good citizenship, numerous T V
channels have been broadcasting programs that would decay one's ethics and provoke his
or her instincts in addition to instigating violence and identifying with western liv in g
patterns which are quite remote from our Islamic and Eastern values and culture.” 16

15 F ro m h ttp //w w w .almanar.com.lb
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Despite the fact that televisions in Lebanon have differing characteristics and
cater to different tastes and backgrounds, there is still no constructive discourse that
w ou ld enable c iv il society in Lebanon to analyze and discuss a unified, or at least a
representative image o f Lebanon that all of the population can agree upon. Furthermore,
u n til this day no independent voices have been able to gain access to these mass media,
and by independent I refer to those not affiliated w ith wealthy opposition businessmen or
w ealthy pro-government businessmen. As a matter o f fact, the only discourse that has
occurred w ithin mass media until this day has happened on the elitist level, leaving the
rest o f the population at the mercy of censorship or lack o f televised access. It is this
reality that has plagued Lebanese television since its inception and one that hinders the
efforts fo r democratization in its fu ll form.
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CONCLUSION
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Media scholars often address the relationship between government and television
in the context of either a western societal structure where this medium usually operates
w ithin the private sector, or a third w orld structure where the medium customarily
operates within the public sector, typica lly as a government arm.

Lebanese media

institutions, however, do not fit either the third world model nor the western model of
media operation, because it is the existing societal forces in every state that determine the
structure, content and operation o f media institutions.

The mass media, therefore, are

unique to their society, and come into existence as result of the existent civil society and
community structure, not as a catalyst to the creation of a new one. They cannot have
identity or effects without the influence o f the concrete instances within which the
different forces operate.

Lebanon is a curious country with many contradictions,

pluralism and deep divisions.

It is a society fragmented along sectarian lines, and is

currently going through a search fo r identity: its institutions are tom between change,
which is exhibited in its relatively modem laws and perspective, and that o f stagnation,
which is demonstrated by the performance o f its political and religious traditional
leadership who put obstacles in the introduction o f change or application of laws that may
lessen the sectarian nature o f the system o f government.
M y point is that the impact o f the New Public Sphere on civil society m ight not be
as influential as some analysts have predicted it to be, or at least not yet. The growth o f
this new form of communication is relatively new, and is still deeply connected to the
traditional state of affairs. Furthermore, the interaction between the New Media and c iv il
society cannot be described as one that is encouraging or permitting democratization and
freedom o f speech, because o f the political and economic structure that directly
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influences the New Media. In other words, it is more accurate to say that the New Media
is a projection o f the Lebanese political discourse, w ith all its omissions and censored
components.

Also, the New Media, in the way it is structured today, is fortifying the

traditional power structure rather than criticizing it, and in some cases it even emulates
the establishment in the format of its control mechanisms.
Even though transnational media can strengthen a certain discourse by taking it
out on the regional and international level, it does not mean that transnational media can
go beyond the local limitations. Just because a media is transnational in its essence does
not mean that the rules that apply to it are very different from the terrestrial media. In fact,
being a satellite television seems to have more lim itations than a terrestrial one,
especially because of the fact that it reaches people beyond boundaries. The
responsibility becomes bigger and the censorship greater, because the government not
only wants to keep the people under control, but also the country’ s image under control,
which means that content and style must be constantly monitored to preserve this
idealistic image a country like Lebanon should have. Moreover, it is not only Lebanon’ s
image that plays a role in determining satellite television content in the Arab world. With
the advent o f reality shows inspired by their Western counterparts, like Future T V ’ s
“ Superstar,” L B C I’ s “ Star Academy,” and the ill-fa te d “ B ig Brother” on MBC, optimists
started hoping that change might indeed come from across the boundaries. However, “ Is
the region's tight moral yam starting to unwind? N o way, say viewers and producers - not
w hile satellite T V has to cater to the social codes o f 22 Arab nations.” (Farah, 2004)
Also, the study showed that the voices behind the new mass media do not differ in
its content and essence from the terrestrial media already put in place. In addition, media
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ownership still follo w s the structure put in place by satellite’ s predecessors. The study
also shows that the difference between satellite and terrestrial content is m inim al, and do
little to promote democratization and much less critical thinking that goes beyond the red
lines already put in place.

Satellite television is thus playing the traditional role of

promoting political agenda fo r the benefit of the political and economic ruling elite,
which goes counter the theories put forward by Adorno, Brecht, Sartre, and others.
Moreover, even Habermas’ bourgeois approach cannot be compared to the elitist
approach the Lebanese elites have towards media.

As a matter o f fact, Habermas’

bourgeoisie confronted the aristocratic status quo, even i f its scope did not go beyond this
particular class.

In the Lebanese case, the elites hold the p o litic a l, religious, and

economic power, and furthermore they control the m ajority o f the com m unication means,
which implies that those w ith less fortune can do little to change the current state of
affairs.
The New Public Sphere that has been created by satellite televisions in Lebanon
did not quite go beyond the usual terrestrial boundaries as was expected by some
observers. In fact, m y point is that all that it helped to do was provide the government
with more excuses and incentives to censor and tone down the opposition. The disillusion
that media has provoked among Lebanese is only part o f the more general disillusion that
the Lebanese p o litica l structure engenders, because media is and remains a part o f the
political body. For this to change, the audiovisual law needs to be respected by both the
government and the satellite television stations alike. M oreover, the satellite television
law needs to be addressed and revised, instead of relying on a one-page law that links
satellite television stations w ith all kinds o f other media and other laws. This cannot be
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done, however, without a change in the political structure itself, thus it needs to be done
first by a change from within society, because this is where the public sphere ultim ately
exists in its entirety. Media can be an effective tool for social movements, but it remains a
tool that can be manipulated by anybody who has the power and means to do it. In the
case o f Lebanon, there is little leeway on how much media can force change on the
political landscape, especially because o f its close connection with this landscape in the
first place.

The only way it can disassociate itself from politics and w ould be by

becoming financially independent, as well as by disassociating itself from its terrestrial
counterparts.
Actually, for a real liberalization o f the medium to happen, it must entail a change
in the political system first, and a change in the social structure and what people perceive
as the root of the problem is. And this cannot happen through the effect o f the media,
because o f its lingering relationship w ith the political structure itself.

Moreover, no

change is possible with the different satellite television channels relying m ostly on
private capital to sustain its existence.

W ith the economic recession and a lack of

advertising revenue, these channels are doomed to remain under the stronghold o f their
local shareholders, and w ill not be able to overcome their limitations.

Lebanon is a

country o f many contradictions, w ith a severe identity crisis: it is both a country that is
trying to modernize its institutions, and one that is clinging to the traditional balance o f
power. The measures taken by government officials throughout Lebanon’ s existence
were aimed not at promoting change, but at making sure the real issues are not dealt w ith.
In fact, until this day, few attempts have been made to analyze the c iv il w ar or the
religious tensions that plague this country, and anything that seems to threaten the status
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quo has been stopped in its early stages. Although Lebanon's democratic development is
hampered by the unstable regional situation, the continued influence wielded by regional
players over Lebanon's domestic and international politics, and the mistrust among the
country's various religious communities, the emergence o f citizen-based movements
outwardly critical o f the Syrian presence in the country has been seen as an encouraging
step towards a more open political system. Public debate over media freedoms, electoral
law and the confessional system itself, has also recently emerged and took force.

In

addition, Lebanon's vibrant and diverse c iv il societies play a vital role in restoring a
degree o f authority to its citizens. Through their efforts to increase the government's
responsiveness to citizens' needs, civil society is leading the movement for further
democratic reform in Lebanon, keeping in mind that satellite and terrestrial television
stations are great tools these movements can use to reach a bigger popular base and raise
awareness, but not lim iting itself to it.
This study only tackles the beginnings o f the new phenomenon of mergers and
expansions that these New Media are currently going through.

However, these latest

developments are o f utmost importance to further critical studies that w ill determine the
actual impact o f satellite televisions on societies sim ilar to the Lebanese society. I also
believe that Lebanese satellite televisions have only recently started to take upon
themselves the role they are really supposed to play on a regional and international level,
through putting their shares on the market and focusing on news in a credible and
professional manner. In fact, Al-Jazeera’ s success owes it first and foremost to the
professionalism and its focus on pertinent news, (Ghadbian, 2001) two elements that until
recently lacked from the Lebanese satellite industry. Therefore, foreign capital as well as
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tackling critical regional and international issues w ill most probably take Lebanese
satellite into a new level, and improve the current discourse. Not relying on local capital
might also give

these news outlets increased freedom o f inform ation and less

governmental control. However, it is still early to determine whether satellite television
in Lebanon w ill be able to overcome its local and regional challenges, or whether the
coming Lebanese governments w ill find new ways to control every new technology that
is put in place, no matter how sophisticated. Moreover, a study o f the development and
metamorphoses o f these stations in the light o f increasing pressure and competition from
their regional and international counterparts w ill definitely be essential in getting a fuller
grasp of the dynamics o f the “ New,” and “ Newer” media.
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Chapter One:
Terms and Objectives
A rtic le One:

The objective o f this law is to organize radio and T V transmission by any technology,
means, or apparatus, regardless of its situation or its name, and to organize the rules and
all matters related to this transmission.
A rtic le Two:

For the purpose of applying this law, the terms mentioned here below have the following
meaning:
Radio Transmission: transmission via electromagnetic waves, or any other means, that
can be received by an audience.
T V Transmission: the transmission of pictures on air, whether moving or otherwise,
accompanied by audio transmission or unaccompanied, via electromagnetic wave or any
other means, that can be received by an audience.
Channel: the frequency slot used by a TV station fo r T V transmission.
Wave: the frequency slot used by a radio station fo r radio transmission.
T V or radio stations: all kinds of transmitter devices, stationary or mobile, and relays and
responders and magnifiers and all networks, whether on earth or in space, which can
directly continue T V and radio transmission.
Re-Transmission: the acquisition of radio or T V programs w holly or in part, regardless of
the technical means which the licensed station uses to transmit these programs to the
audience, and re-transmitting these programs w ithout change, live or delayed.
T V station: any entity that organizes and transmits a T V program to an audience, or that
copies it unchanged to a third party.
Radio station: any entity that organizes and transmits a radio program to an audience, or
that copies it unchanged to a third party.
Program: A ll the service elements provided by the station, as mentioned in the previous
section.
Advertisements: The commercials that are directed to the public, within the time frame
granted to the advertiser, for the purpose o f promoting a product or a service, or buying
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or renting it, or to propagate a certain a certain issue or opinion or induce any other effect
the advertiser wishes to induce.
Literary, artistic, musical, scientific right owner: Any real person or entity that creates an
achievement o f literary, artistic, musical, or scientific nature. Or that requires the
investment rights o f such an achievement.

Chapter Two:
A rticle Three:

Audiovisual media are free enterprises. The freedom of the media is to be practiced
within the framework o f the constitution and the applied laws.
A rticle F o u r:

It is meant by audiovisual media, any T V and radio transmission operation that addresses
the public or part o f it, via signals or pictures or sounds or writings o f any sort that are not
characterized by the personal communication characteristics, through channels and waves
and transmission devices and networks and other transmission or transmission devices or
technologies.
A rticle Five:

Establishing T V or radio stations inside the Lebanese territory or in national waters is
subject to prior licensing.
A rticle Six:

It is prohibited for nay person or entity without the prior licensing to im port or
manufacture or assemble or use any transmission device or relay any audio or visual
transmission. The authorities w ill confiscate all devices, parts and equipment that are
imported or manufactured or used or being assembled without prio r licensing. Penalties
mentioned in the applied laws w ill be imposed on whoever violates the above rulings.
A rticle Seven:

The flow ing matters are taken into consideration when granting a license. First: imposing
on the station a certain technical standard for its transmission via its channel or wave,
meeting the operational conditions or requirements, of human resources, programs,
locations, installations, equipment, studios, and stations. Also, the station’ s a b ility to
sustain its costs at least for the first year of its licensing.
Second: the respect o f the human character and the freedom o f others and their rights and
the multitude o f opinions and points o f view and the objectivity o f the news bulletins and
keeping o f the public order and national defense requirements are all imperative.
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Third: imposing on the station the volume o f local production that is determined by the
book of conditions for each category or local production.
Fourth: stations are obliged to apply the general laws, in a way that does not c on flict with
this law.
Fifth: stations are not allowed to retain any financial gain that is not secured from its
operations, whether directly or indirectly.
Sixth: stations are prohibited from transmitting whatever may promote relations w ith the
Zionist enemy.
A rticle Eight:

On granting licenses it is taken into consideration that there are rights related to channels
and airwaves that exist in Lebanon as a result o f previous agreements. These channels
and airwaves w ill be determined and distributed according to technical criteria o f
international standards assuring a clear and advanced transmission.
A technical committee is formed and called the T V and Radio Transmission Organization
Committee. This committee works in conjunction with the Minister of Inform ation and
consists of the Director General o f Investments at the M inistry of Information, a
representative of the Defense M in istry, four experienced communication engineers
appointed by a government device upon three recommendations of the M inister o f
Information and the M inister o f Telecommunications and Post, Technical D irector at
Radio Lebanon and the Technical Director at Tele-Liban and the technical
representatives from other T V and Radio stations.
This committee w ill study all the technical aspects relating to TV and radio transmissions,
and submit the necessary recommendations to the minister o f Information and the
members of the committee.
A rticle Nine:

The State is the sole and exclusive owner o f all the channels and airwaves and these
cannot be sold or leased.
The station can utilize the channel; or airwaves by renting it according to the applied laws
and regulation. The right to utilize an airwave or channel is not by any means an
exclusive concession and after the end o f the rent contract, no compensation righ t ensues
of any kind and the rend duration is determined by the license. The TV or radio station
has no right to sell its rental rights, w ho lly or in part, or even to lease them or to waive
them, directly or indirectly. In the event o f any violation of the above, the station w ill be
forced to cease transmission immediately.

90

C h a p te r Three:
The classification of TV and Radio stations:

A rticle Ten:
T V stations are categorized according to the follow ing:
1. T V stations that transmit visual programs, including news and political programs,
and that cover all of the Lebanese territory.
2. T V stations that transmit visual programs, except news and political programs,
and that cover all of the Lebanese territory.
3. T V stations that transmit coded signals that can only be received by subscribers
who process the necessary technical equipment.
4. International TV stations that transmit via satellite and whose coverage exceeds
the Lebanese territory.

A rticle Eleven:
Radio stations are categorized according to the follow ing:
1. Radio stations that transmit different kinds o f programs including news and
political programs that cover all the Lebanese territory.
2. Radio stations that transmit different kinds o f programs except news and political
programs and that cover the Lebanese territory.
3. Radio stations that transmit coded signals that can only be received by subscribers
who possess the necessary technical equipment.
4. International radio stations that transmit via satellite whose coverage exceeds the
Lebanese territory.
C h a p te r Four:
Setting up the station

A rticle Twelve:
The T V or radio station is established in the form o f a Lebanese Anonymous Company
that cannot own more than one TV or radio station.

A rticle Thirteen:
A ll the shares in this company have to be nominal and the shareholders have to meet the
follo w in g conditions:
The real shareholder has to be a Lebanese citizen legally eligible and not
convicted of any cnme or violation and not deprived o f his civil rights.
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The entity shareholder has to be a purely Lebanese company, the internal system
of which prevents it from passing over these shares to non-Lebanese persons or
companies.
It is not allowed for a real person or entity to own directly or indirectly more than
ten percent o f the total company shares. The husband and w ife and all direct
relatives are to be considered one person or entity.

Article Fourteen:
Founders o f such a company are obliged to own at least thirty five percent o f its capital
and are not allowed to sell their shares for five years from the date o f issuing the license.
The company has to publish in the official gazette a list o f all its shareholders with their
relative shares at the time o f issuing the license. In case shares are bought ad sold, the
company has to republish this list in the same manner.

Article Fifteen:
A ll the shares’ movements in the T V and radio stations are subject to prior licensing. Any
selling or buying or passing over of shares that is done w ith no prior licensing is
considered null or void.
A penalty is imposed on whoever commits an illegal action, o f the sort mentioned above,
or participates in it, that consists of the value of the shares that were sold or passed over
and of a ja il sentence from six months to three years, and the confiscation o f shares by the
state, which can sell them according to applied laws.
The rules of this article also apply to actions committed by an intermediary, who is
considered liable fo r the fine mentioned above.
Any agreement or contract pertaining to the above mentioned is considered null and void
and no compensation of any kind ensues.
Chapter Five:
Licensing

Article Sixteen:
Licenses are granted to the T V and radio stations in accordance w ith a decree issued by
the government after consulting the National Council for A udio Visual Media.
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Article Seventeen:
A committee is formed under the name The National Council for Audio Visual Media
(N C A VM ) that comprises ten members appointed jo in tly and equally by the government
and parliament.

Article Eighteen:
The members of this committee have to be Lebanese citizens qualified in the fields of
science, literature, technical specialization and so on, and who are not employed by the
state or municipalities for any function or in any capacity.

Article Nineteen:
In addition to other functions mentioned previously in this law, the function o f the
National Council of Audio Visual Media is as follows:
1. The consideration o f license applications submitted to the government and
referred to it by the M in istry o f Information. When necessary, this committee can
seek the advice of a specialist in the media.
2. Making sure that the legal requirements are met.
3. Submitting recommendations in which they state whether any license application
should be approved or rejected. This recommendation is published in the official
gazette as soon as the M inister o f Information deposits it in the governmental
system and before nay decision is made by the government regarding license
application.
4. The National Council o f A udio Visual Media has to finalize its recommendation
and present it within fo rty days from the date it received the license application.
5. The government through the M inister of Information w ill place the license
application and all the required documents and technical information at the
disposal of the National Council o f Audio Visual Media.

Article Twenty:
1. The N C A V M ’ s term is three years, renewable.
2. In the event of any membership vacancy, for any reason, a new member w ill be
appointed in the same manner adopted to appoint the previous member, and
within one month, for the rest of the term.
3. Any member who fails to attend three consecutive sessions w ith no valid excuse
is considered to have resigned.

Article Twenty-One:
Members of N C A V M are prohibited from engaging in any other business that conflicts
with the nature o f their work fo r the council.
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A rticle Twenty-Two:
The N C A V M legislates its modus operandi and the government approves it.

A rtic le Twenty-Three:
The members’ compensation schemes are specified by the government.

A rtic le Twenty-Four:
A n y decision issued by the government can be reviewed before the State Jury in case any
legal licensing law was broken.

A rtic le Twenty-Five:
A ll the exemplary conditions are to be prepared and listed by one or more specialized
committees depending on the nature of the subjects. This committee is formed by a
decree issued by the government, and the committee can seek the advice of specialists
and technicians o f its choice.
This exemplary condition logbook is accredited by a government decree after consulting
the higher media council.

A rticle Twenty-Six:
The duration o f the license is sixteen years, renewable, provided the station applies three
years prior to the expired date of the license.

A rtic le Twenty-Seven:
First: The license fee payable by the TV or radio station is determined as follows:
1. T V stations o f first and second categories: two hundred and fifty m illion Lebanese
Pounds (1$=1,500LP)
2. Radio stations of the first category: one hundred and twenty five m illion Lebanese
Pounds.
3. Radio stations of the second category: fifty m illio n Lebanese Pounds.
Second: the yearly rental fee payable by the T V and radio stations is determined as
follow s:
1. T V stations o f the first and second categories: one m illion Lebanese Pounds.
2. Radio stations of the first category: twenty m illio n Lebanese Pounds.
3. Radio stations of the second category: fifteen m illio n Lebanese Pounds.
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Chapter Six:
The management and duties o f stations

Article Twenty-Eight:
Each television or radio station must appoint a program director. First category stations
that transmit news bulletins and political programs must appoint a director in charge of
such programs.
The director has to be a Lebanese citizen for more than ten years, enjoy legal competence,
not be convicted in any crime or misdemeanor, and ready to w ork in fu ll time capacity
for the station.

Article Twenty-Nine:
The TV or radio station must publish in the official gazette, in local newspapers and in
the commercial register the names of its chairman and board members and has to also
provide the public w ith a list o f all shareholders.

Article Thirty.
TV and radio station s have to transmit national orientation programs, educational, health,
intellectual, and tourist programs at the rate of one hour per week. These programs are to
be aired free o f charge and according to the request of the M inistry o f Information in the
air times determined by the conditions logbook. Materials required fo r transmission are
either supplied by the M in istry o f Information or from the stations’ archives.

Article Thirty-One:
Any person or entity has the right to defend himself against any allegations transmitted
by any T V or radio station.
The station in question has to transmit the defense under the same technical conditions
that the allegations were transmitted in, and in a fashion that ensures the same audience.
It is up to the M inister o f Information to request transmission o f any correction or
negation o f any news item that has to do with any public interest or administration
according to the norms specified under the publication law.
The right defense has to be exercised during the specific periods, and according to the
law, and under the penalties mentioned in the publication laws and their amendments.
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Article Thirty-Two:
The license decree is issued after verifying that the station has abided by the required
conditions. The station is given a one year period, from the date it is informed by the
government, to put itself into operation according to the legal conditions, and the
government can extend this period i f it deems it necessary, and it loses its rights to obtain
a license should it fail to request from the M inistry o f Information verification that the
station has abided by the legal, technical and financial licensing conditions, before the
one year period.

Article Thirty-Three:
The T V and radio stations bear the legal responsibility that ensues legally from any
malpractice in its operations.
Chapter Seven:
Restrictions and penalties

Article Thirty-Four:
The T V and radio stations are obliged to abide by the licensing and legal rules.

Article Thirty-Five:
1. In the event the station does not abide by the requirements of this law and other
laws, the following procedure is applied.
First violation: Based on the recommendation o f the National Council fo r Audio
Visual Media, the M inister o f Information orders a three-day suspension o f the
station in question.
Second violation: Based on the M inister o f Information’ s recommendation,
originating from the recommendation submitted by the N C AVM , the government
orders the station in question to halt its transmission for a minimum period of
three days and a maxim um period o f one month.
The N C A V M meets under its own initiative or i f summoned by the M inister of
Information.
The Minister o f Inform ation can waive the council’ s recommendation should the
council fail to meet w ith in forty eight hours o f the minister’ s summons.
A ll decisions mentioned under this article are subject to revision before a
specialized court that studies the case w ithin a period of one year according to the
applied laws. In the event that the procedure inflicted on the station is not
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constitutional, the station can claim a maxim um o f up to 10 m illion Lebanese
Pounds for every day of non-transmission, and the radio station 3 m illion LP.
2. In addition to item 1 above, all the penalties mentioned in the general penalties
law and in the publication law and in this law and others, are applied to the
violations committed by TV and radio stations. These penalties w ill be applied to
their maximum as mentioned in article 257 o f the penalties law.
The sentence “ TV and radio stations” is added wherever needed in the mentioned
law and transmission is considered equal to publication, which is mentioned in
article 209 of the penalties law.
C h a pter E ig h t:
Advertisements

A rticle Thirty-Six:
T V and radio stations should refrain from airing any advertisement that might misinform
the consumer, harm his health or interests, or includes any violation of public morals.

A rticle Thirty-Seven:
Advertisements should be prepared clearly and easily and in a manner different audio
visually from the programs during which they are aired. Newscasters are not permitted to
appear or be heard in an advertisement.

A rticle Thirty-Eight:
Advertisements are to be aired between each program and can be aired during a program,
provided that the unity and value of the program are intact, and in a manner not harmful
to the owners o f the program’ s literary and artistic rights.

A rticle Thirty-Nine:
It is mandatory that each station establishes or deals w ith a media concessionaire (Regie)
that solicits advertisements and that manages its advertising affairs.
The advertising management in a TV or radio station and the advertising agencies are not
permitted to contract their advertisements to one medium exclusively.
It is forbidden for the owners of a T V or radio station or their Regie and their spouses and
children to have shares in more than one establishment. Also full-tim e employees in a
Regie can only serve on TV and one radio station.
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Article Forty:
A ll matters related to the subject of advertisements that are not mentioned in this law are
to be regulated by a special law.
Chapter Nine:
Tele Liban

Article Forty-One:
1. The exclusive rights originally granted to Tele-Liban to utilize all T V channels
are canceled. Tele Liban is granted the right to transmit on all V H F channels and
one program on the U H F channels, according to the technical organization that
would distribute the channels to the licensed stations.
In compensation Tele Liban w ill be exempted from paying the fees applicable to
other stations until the year 2012 when its exclusivity rights w ill end.
2. Tele Liban has no right thereof for compensation in any kind, w ith the exception
o f the compensation mentioned above.
3. The government has the right to reorganize Tele Lib a n ’ s operation by special
government decrees issued on the basis of recommendations issued by the
Ministers o f Finance and Information.
Chapter Ten:
Station income audit

Article Forty-Two:
At the end of every six months, the station has to submit to the M in is try o f Information as
statement o f its investment account.
This account includes only the sums and income that originate fro m the station’ s business
operations under the legal and technical consensus. The m inistry in question has to audit
this account and v e rify the income form advertisements, production sales and others i f
necessary, u tilizin g all available audit methods including auditing the licensed stations
and advertising agencies’ books.
In the event the station falls under financial deficit that does not exceed three quarters of
its capital submitted in the previous statement, the M inister o f Inform ation can grant the
licensed station a period o f six months at the end of which the station should submit its
investment account. I f after this period the income did not cover h a lf o f this deficit, the
Minister o f Inform ation has the right to request the publications court to issue a verdict
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by which the station has to cease transmission for a period decided by the court but no
exceeding one year.
Should the deficit turn out to exceed three quarters of the stations’ capital, the M inister of
Information has the right to refer the station to a specialized jurisdiction in order to
decide on ceasing transmission immediately and without prior notice, for a period not
exceeding one year. Financial deficit means the accumulated financial deficit.

Article Forty Three:
After the suspension period expires, the station cannot resume transmission unless it
proves it has acquired the necessary funds required to cover the whole deficit, in which
case it has to submit the source o f funds and the method by which they were acquired.
The Minister of Information can request more clarification and evidence and
consequently make a decision to allow the station to resume transmission in light of that
evidence and statements submitted by the station, clarifying the sources o f the funds and
their authenticity, and after ensuring that the station was not engaged in any action that
could conflict with public interests.

Article Forty-Four:
Any violator of articles 42 and 43 previously mentioned in this law, or to any o f them, is
penalized by jail sentence varying from three months to one year; and by a fine o f ten to
thirty m illion LP, or both penalties.

Article Forty-Five:
In the event the station achieved a financial gain that cannot be legally accounted for, the
Minister of Information can request the publication court to issue an order to cease
transmission for a penod ranging from three to six months.
The court must also impose a fine on the station in question equivalent in value to double
the amount unaccounted for financial gain.
In the event that it was proven that this gain was obtained with the intention to serve
another state, or any foreign or local institution in a manner that conflicts w ith the public
interests or that touches on the political system or that ignites sectarian conflicts or
encourages havoc and acts of turm oil, the penalty would be six months to two years ja il
sentence and a fine ranging from 50 to 100 m illion LP.
The court can rule that the station ceases transmission for a period ranging from six
months to two years and can also rule to cancel the license issued for this station
indefinitely.
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A rticle Forty-Six:
The mechanism by which the station audit is carried on is determined by a decree issued
by the government based on the Minister of Information's recommendation.
C hapter Eleven:
Censorship on TV and Radio stations

A rticle Forty-Seven:
B y request o f the Ministry of Information, the National Council for Audio Visual Media
practices censorship over TV and radio stations.
C hapter Twelve:

A rticle Forty-Eight:
A ll the rulings of the law of commerce that do not conflict with the rulings of this law are
applied.

A rticle Forty-Nine:
I f necessary, the details required in the application o f this law are specified by
government decrees based on recommendations submitted by relevant ministers.

A rticle Fifty:
T V and radio stations are granted a period of tw o months prior to putting this law into
effect to present license applications after the M in istry o f Information announces that it is
receiving them. The government can grant additional extensions to complete the
application file.
These stations remain operational until the license decree is issued and resume their
operation accordingly thereof, or are given a period of time to liquidate their assets in
case their application were rejected.

A rticle Fifty-One:
A ll the T V and radio stations are exempted from fines, taxes, and fees of any kind before
this law came into force.

A rticle Fifty-Two:
A ll the previous legislation that contradicts or conflicts w ith this law is canceled.
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Article Fifty-Three:
This law becomes effective immediately after its publication in the official gazette.

Source: The National Council for Audio Visual Media (Kraidy, Marwan, Trans.)
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A ppendix B
S atellite Broadcast Amendments

1996
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C hapter One:
This law specifies:
1. The rental process or transmitters and airwaves through satellites dishes and
terrestrial stations owned by the M in is try o f Telecommunications.
2. The fees that such rental incurs.
C hapter Tw o:
Renting equipment for satellite transmission is approved through recommendation of the
M inister o f Telecommunications, according to guidelines set by the ministry and by this
law.
Licensing falls under the jurisdiction of laws 233, 234, 235, and 250 of decree number
126 dated 6/12/1959.
C hapter Three:
The licensing application should be submitted to the M inister of Telecommunications in
three copies, and the Minister then asks fo r the counsel o f the M inister of Information in
decision-making, for a duration that does not exceed 15 days.
The application should include the follow ing:
1. Name and address of the station to be licensed.
2. Name and address of the person responsible fo r broadcasting.
3. Technical study that delineates the source o f transmission and clarifies the
equipment’ s technical description to be linked to the terrestrial station, as well as
the technical means of transmission.
Commitment
4. The station commits to follow the laws and not to transm it:
a. Political news, directly or indirectly, unless it is licensed to do so through
a decision made in the M inisters’ Cabinet follow ing the recommendation
of the Minister of Information.
b. Programs that might endanger public safety and national security, or that
would affect the nation's relations w ith Arabic or Foreign friendly
countries, or programs that w ould endanger these countries’ national
security.
c. Pornographic programs.
d. Programs that might instigate confessional conflicts or that would insult a
certain religion.
e. Anything that might promote a relationship with the Zionist enemy.
f. Any programs without permission by its owner(s).
g. The Institution should get an approval from the M inister o f Information
before airing its programs.
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h. The Institution should put a bank deposit that is unconditional (200
m illio n LP) to pay for any violation o f the laws, especially law 382/94,
and should make sure the amount stays the same after each fine, under the
risk of having its license revoked.
The M inister o f Information is responsible for implementing the clauses mentioned above,
and in case o f violation the Minister’ s Cabinet, following a recommendation from the
Minister o f Information, can suspend transmission for a month at the most and without
compensation.
Chapter F o u r:
The Court Jurisdiction
The Ministers’ Cabinet, follow ing the recommendation o f the M inister o f Information
and Foreign A ffa irs Minister, can ask for the court’ s decision in a matter o f violation, and
the channel can have its license revoked without any compensation except for the license
fee of the duration of time it was stopped.
License can be revoked in case of any violation, including laws number 126 and 127 or
1959.
Chapter Five:
The station should provide:
1.
2.

The M icrowave equipment needed to link its satellite station with its
terrestrial counterpart.
The necessary equipment needed for the UP L in k and the D O W N Link to
receive and transmit airwaves through the terrestrial stations.

The follow ing guidelines should be followed:
a.
b.

c.
d.

The conditions put forth by the Ministry o f Telecommunications
The conditions put forth by the International Counseling Committee for
Telegraphs and Telephones. (CCITT) and the International Counseling
Committee fo r Telecommunications (CCIR)
That its transmission does not affect other communications on the airwaves.
That the institution provides maintenance fo r its equipment continuously.

Chapter Six:
Rental Duration
1.

Rental lasts three years, and transmission can go up to 24 hours daily, but no
less than 12 hours daily.
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2.

The Ministry of Telecommunications may rent the airwaves fo r a duration that
is less than three years, especially for international news agencies.

The rental conditions and fees are decided by the M inistry of Telecommunications.
Chapter Seven:
Rental process
Fees are due every beginning o f the year and every rented year is 12 months, w ith 30 day
months.
Chapter Eight:
Rental Fees
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Application Fee: 1 M illio n LP (Due when applying)
Founding Fee: 400,000 LP (Due when signing the contract w ith the
government)
Monthly Channel Fee: 1st channel: 75,000 LP; 2nd channel: 50,000 LP; all
other channels: 40,000 LP. D igital channel fees are doubled.
Yearly fess: 60,000 LP for each channel.
Yearly equipment fees: 5,000 LP

C hapter Nine:
The fees are paid in Lebanese Pound.
Chapter Ten:
A ll laws that contradict this law are cancelled, except for law 382/94
This law does not include encrypted television transmission.
C hapter Eleven:
The implementation of this law is undertaken in the Minister’ s cabinet through o ffic ia l
decrees.
C hapter Twelve:
This law becomes effective immediately after its publication in the officia l gazette.

Source: The National Council fo r Audio Visual Media (Youssef, Yara, Trans.)

105

